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PREFACE
The absence of reliable documentation covering Kampuchean- 
Vietnamese communist relations during the 1960's and early 
1970's has placed certain constraints on this paper. During 
the period under discussion the Kampuchean revolutionary leaders 
with their penchant for extreme secrecy, ensured that very 
little was written down. The Khmer communists have subsequently 
made up for their earlier reticence by issuing a number of 
documents which provide retrospective accounts of VWP-CPK 
relations during this period. These accounts tend to be little 
more than questionable tales of Vietnamese deviousness and 
perfidy, however. The Vietnamese, for their part, have been 
particularly reluctant to respond to the Kampuchean's 
allegations.
Nevertheless, a few captured Khmer Rouge and Viet Cong 
documents written during the early 1970's are now available to 
the historian, as are various reports provided by communist 
defectors and western intelligence services. By consulting 
these and other sources, and by reading between the lines of 
the "histories" provided by the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea 
and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, it has been possible to 
piece together the story of how the rift between these two 
parties‘developed. Unfortunately, many of the documents 
consulted are not available in published form. I am 
particularly indebted to Dr. Ben Kiernan for providing me with 
so many of the documents in his possession.
INTRODUCTION
1Although the outbreak of war between the Kampuchean and 
Vietnamese communist regimes during the late 1970's came as a 
surprise to those Western policy makers who had refused to 
discard the notion of Indochinese communism as a monolithic 
force, this conflict marked the culmination of tensions which 
had been developing since the early 1960's. It is the development 
of this rift between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist 
parties, which was given little attention in the West until 
hostilities began in 1977, that this paper seeks to examine.
For the purposes of this discussion, the period 1963-1975 
will be split into four sections: each chapter will cover a 
period of approximately three years. The discussion proper 
begins with the departure of the Pol Pot group from Phnom Penh 
in 1963. The second chapter commences with the 1967 Samlaut 
uprising and draws to a close at the end of 1969, on the eve 
of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's deposition. The following section 
finishes with the signing of the Paris Accords in January 1973, 
and the final chapter ends with the Kampuchean revolutionaries' 
victory over the Lon Nol regime in April 1975. As will be 
seen, each of these developments marked a significant point in 
the breakdown of the relationship between the communist parties 
of Vietnam and Kampuchea. Before proceeding with this 
discussion, it will be useful to conduct a brief examination 
of the relationship between the revolutionary movements of 
these two countries as it developed between 1930 and 1963: 
this background study will largely be based on secondary sources.
1 1
In February 1930, on the initiative of Ho Chi Minh,
three Vietnamese communist groups met in Hong Kong to discuss
the formation of a unified communist party. During this
meeting Ho Chi Minh urged against the assertion of a
Vietnamese responsibility for revolution in Laos and
Kampuchea. In fact, he suggested that the term "Indo-Chinese"
would be too broad to describe the new p a r t y . ^  By the
time the meeting finished, it had been agreed that a new
party - the Vietnam Communist Party - should be formed. Soon
afterwards, however, Stalin's Communist International directed
that the name be changed to the Indochinese Communist Party
(ICP), and that committees be established in Laos and 
(2 )Kampuchea. Although the Vietnamese communists obediently
implemented this directive, their initial reluctance to take 
responsibility for the political fate of their neighbours 
clearly demonstrated that they considered the encouragement 
of revolutionary potential within countries like Kampuchea to 
be much less important than the struggle for the liberation 
of Vietnam itself.
The new party was not particularly active in Kampuchea 
during the 1930s. Seeing little prospect for organising an 
indigenous Khmer communist movement, the ICP concentrated its
organisational activities in Kampuchea on tfre Vietnamese
Í 3 )  .population there. During this period the ICP made it quite
clear that, if all three Indochinese states were to be
involved in the revolution, Vietnam would lead the struggle.
In 1934, an ICP document stressed that there was
no place for considering a Kampuchean 
revolution on its own. There can only 
be an Indochinese Revolution. (4)
In 1935 the Vietnamese communists proposed that, after
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the struggle against imperialism was over, Kampuchea and
Vietnam should join with Laos in forming an "Indochinese 
(5 )Federation". Documents published by the Democratic
Kampuchea regime during the 1970s have claimed that what the 
Vietnamese communists really envisaged was a single post­
colonial state dominated by Vietnam, and that the Vietnamese 
never abandoned this desire for hegemony over Indochina:
Vietnam, which has always had the 
ambition to annex and swallow 
Kampuchea, and to exterminate the 
nation of Kampuchea through its 
sinister strategy of "Indochina 
Federation", has carried out the 
most perfidious activities for many 
decades. (6)
On the other hand, the Vietnamese communists have maintained
that the idea of an Indochinese federation was abandoned in
(7)1951. In fact, it has been asserted that the Vietnamese
were never particularly interested in the idea: that the 
Vietnamese proposal was little more than a reluctant 
concession to Comintern demands. 7
Events which unfolded in 1945 forced the ICP to pay more 
attention to Kampuchea. The Japanese surrender, the 
establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi 
and the threat of French re-occupation of Indochina created 
immediate strategic problems. The Vietnamese communists1
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choice of policy on Kampuchea was influenced by the fact that
certain non-communist Kampuchean nationalists were willing to
(9)unite with the Vietnamese to oppose the returning French.
The ICP quickly became involved in the development of the 
"Khmer Issarak" (Free Khmer) movement: a broadly based 
revolutionary front organisation. At the same time, the ICP 
sought to encourage the growth of a pro-communist element
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within this movement.
Towards the end of the 1940s certain developments forced
the ICP to revise its strategies, giving real urgency to the
building of a communist movement within Kampuchea for the
first time. In 1949 the French recognised the "independence"
(within the French Union) of the Royal Governments of Laos
and Kampuchea, as well as that of the Bao Dai regime in
South Vietnam. The ICP leaders - who were, according to
Porter, "eager not to be portrayed as the only remaining
imperialists in Indochina" - began to re-assess the
whole question of a single party for all three countries.
Moreover, the Vietnamese communists were beginning to lose
the support of their non-communist Khmer allies, partially
as a result of the granting of "independence". A considerable
number of Issaraks, believing that there was no longer any
need to continue the struggle, abandoned the revolutionary
movement at this time. This trend was climaxed in 1949, by
the surrender to the French of Dap Chhuon, a powerful
(12)Khmer nationalist. Although a number of independent
"warlords" continued to participate in the anti-colonial 
struggle, many became increasingly hostile towards the
(13)Vietnamese communists and their leftist allies. Also,
communist forces emerged as the victors of the civil war in
China in 1949. The ICP regarded this triumph as a signal for
the transition to a new phase of the Indochinese war, which
would ultimately see the launching of a general counter-
(14)offensive against the French: in 1950, General Giap
called for the "active construction" of independent armies in
(15)Laos and Kampuchea.
In April 1950, following secret negotiations between the
VICP leadership and a number of pro-Vietnamese Issaraks,
the United Issarak Front (UIF) was formed at the "First
National Congress of the Khmer Resistance". The central
committee of the UIF was led by Son Ngoc Minh - the ICP
leader of the Issaraks' South West military zone. This
congress also established a proto-government, which was almost
entirely made up of ICP members.
These developments were soon followed by the 1951
decision to disband the ICP and establish separate parties in
Laos and Kampuchea. The statutes of the new Khmer Peoples
Revolutionary Party (KPRP) - also led by Son Ngoc Minh - gave
it a mandate to fight against Imperialism, but did not mention
communism. ' According to Vietnamese documents, the KPRP
did not only represent the proletariat, but rather, gathered
together "all the patriotic and progressive elements of the
(19)Khmer population". It has been asserted that, by
assigning the KPRP a low ideological status, the Vietnamese
party was seeking to define the Kampuchean movement as an
"adjunct to the Vietnamese resistance against the French".
Although ethnic Khmers held a number of key positions
within the new party organisation, most members of the KPRP
(21)provisional central committee were Vietnamese: these
leaders, undoubtedly agreed with the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) 
on such issues as the need for a co-ordinated revolutionary 
struggle in Indochina.
Captured Viet Minh docuemnts indicate that the VWP
leaders were determined to maintain their influence over the
(22)Kampuchean party.v ’ Under the direction of Tou Samouth 
(Son Ngoc Minh's lieutenant), training programs for Khmer 
revolutionaries - usually run by Vietnamese instructors or
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í 23)conducted in Vietnam itself - were established. in this
(24 )way the "foundations of Khmer Communism" were laid.
The early fifties marked a period of growth for the
Kampuchean movement: in 1952 French intelligence services
estimated that UIF guerrillas were operating freely over two-
(25)thirds of the countryside. Although ethnic Vietnamese
still dominated the higher administrative levels of the KPRP,
the proportion of ethnic Khmers involved in the movement
(26)increased steadily during this period.v 1 However, by the 
end of 1954 this period of growth had come to a rather abrupt 
end.
In 1953 Prince Sihanouk began his "royal crusade" for 
unqualified independence from France. The success of this 
"crusade" cut the ground from beneath the feet of Sihanouk's 
revolutionary opponents. Following the recognition of full 
political independence in November 1953, a large number of
(27)non-communist Issarak bands decided to lay down their arms. 
Then, in 1954, the Viet Minh succeeded in forcing the French 
to the conference table in Geneva.
The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea have claimed that the 
Vietnamese communists betrayed their Kampuchean comrades at 
Geneva. According to this view, the Vietnamese communists - 
by abanàoning their demands that the UIF be represented at the 
Conference and that regroupment zones for the Issarak forces 
be established within Kampuchea - sacrificed the Kampuchean 
movement in order to extract a more favourable settlement for 
themselves. A careful examination of the events
surrounding the conference suggests that, in fact, the 
Vietnamese communists only discontinued their efforts on 
behalf of the Kampuchean revolutionaries when the major
Vil
communist powers - in particular, China - exerted pressure
There seems to be little basis, however, to assertions 
that China was seeking to foster a rift between the Kampuchean 
and Vietnamese parties. The Chinese were primarily motivated
Dulles had made it clear that the United States was prepared 
to "internationalise" the war. Zou Enlai was unwilling to 
provide the Americans with an excuse to gain a foothold in 
South East Asia, and - according to one source - was 
suspicious that the conference was being used as a delaying 
tactic : to give the United States more time to prepare its 
forces. Given this scenario, it is not surprising that
the Chinese decided the Kampucheans' cause was expendable. 
Thus, the Khmer communists became victims of the Cold War. 
However, by compromising over Kampuchea the Vietnamese 
communists were sowing the seeds of future bitterness.
The Geneva settlement called for the complete withdrawal 
of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. The Vietnamese withdrew 
not only their troops but their party cadres as well, thus 
leaving the Kampuchean party entirely in the hands of their 
Khmer comrades for the first time. On the advice of the 
Vietnamèse, however, many KPRP members - including Son Ngoc 
Minh and other party leaders - also left Kampuchea for 
Hanoi. (31)
The communists who remained behind organised the Krom 
Pracheachon (Citizens' Group)- a legal front organisation for 
the KPRP - to contest the September 1955 elections for the 
Kampuchean National Assembly. The campaign, which was marked 
by the violent repression of various leftist groups by
(29)on them to do so.
5by fears for their own security:
vi i i
(32)Sihanouk's security forces, resulted in an overwhelming
(3 3 )"victory" for Sihanouk's Sangkum organisation.
The Vietnamese communists' reaction to the 1955 elections
was one of censure : Hanoi accused the Royal Khmer government
of violating the Geneva Accords by holding elections without
(34)democratic freedoms. However, as the first signs of a
neutral Kampuchean foreign policy began to emerge during the
mid fifties, with Sihanouk's growing opposition to an
American military presence in Kampuchea, the Vietnamese
became less vociferous in their condemnation of the Prince's
(35)repressive activities Although the Vietnamese communists'
view of Sihanouk must have improved as a result of the
Prince's involvement in The 1955 Bandung Conference, the
real turning point came in 1956, when he rebuffed pressures
(36)to join SEATO. J A policy of non-alignment was something
Hanoi wished to encourage. The VWP leadership began to
emphasize the importance of maintaining the status quo in
Kampuchea, recommending that the KPRP limit itself to
(37)"peaceful political struggle". Warmer relations between
Phnom Penh and Hanoi did not prevent repression of the radical
( 38 )left within Kampuchea from continuing, however.
Those young Khmers whose first exposure to left-wing
politic's took place during this period had little reason to
be endeared to the Vietnamese communists. A small group of
young Kampuchean communists who spent the early 1950's
studying in France deserve special attention. These students
(39)formed a "Marxist Circle" in Paris in 1950. Some of the
members of this circle were later to emerge as the leaders of 
the Kampuchean communist party. Kiernan comments that, while 
in Europe, these young ideologues were unlikely to have
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remained in touch with the "fundamental motivations of
Kampuchean communists at home"
In 1953 Saloth Sar - one of these young intellectuals -
returned to Kampuchea. After a short period in Phnom Penh,
Sar set out for the UIF headquarters near the border with
(41 )Vietnam. There, he was appointed to an ICP cell. This
fact has led Heder to assert that Sarfs "essential political
. . (42)training was m  the ICP tradition". According to a
number of sources, however, Sar did not enjoy this
experience: he felt that his intellectual capabilities were
ignored, and grew to resent the Vietnamese who directed his
training.
By 1956, Sar and a few other students from the "Marxist
Circle" had found their way back to Phnom Penh, where they
became involved, through the Phnom Penh committee of the
(44)KPRP, in the formation of the Pracheachon. Over the next
few years this group extended its influence, reportedly coming
into frequent conflict with the KPRP leadership over 
(45)strategy. While the party leaders were prepared to
adhere to the Vietnamese communists* recommendation that the 
KPRP limit its activities to "peaceful political struggle", 
the younger communists led by Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary
» yLÄ \rejected this strategy, referring to it as "revisionism". '
These men and women apparently considered the struggle
against Sihanouk to be necessary regardless of the effects
it might have on their Vietnamese brethren.
At the 1960 KPRP Congress it was decided that the party
should assume Marxist-Leninist status and change its name to
the Workers Party of Kampuchea (WPK), thus bringing it into
(47)line with the Vietnam Workers' Party. Also, a number of
the young Kampuchean radicals were elevated to important
party positions: most notably, Saloth Sar was elected to the
number three position in the WPK politburo.
In 1962, party secretary Tou Samouth disappeared: it has
never been conclusively established whether Samouth was
eliminated by Sihanouk's police or by the radical faction of 
(49)the WPK. Saloth Sar assumed the position of acting
secretary, and the conflict between the two factions
crystallized into a clear cut struggle for the formal
leadership of the p a r t y . A t  the Third Party Congress in
1963, Saloth Sar was confirmed as secretary-general of the
WPK. The newly elected central committee which he headed
included very few veterans of the pre-1954 struggle.
Although the VWP was reportedly determined to oppose the
(Si)"infantile communism" of the "Parisians", it is unclear 
whether or not they opposed Sar's leadership bid.
It would be appropriate, at this stage, to make a number 
of general observations concerning the relationship between 
the Kampuchean and Vietnamese revolutionary movements over 
the period 1930-1963.
Once they had put their initial reluctance to involve 
themselves in Kampuchea behind them, the Vietnamese communists 
exhibited a certain amount of consistency in their emphasis 
on the importance of having some sort of influence within 
Kampuchea. On the other hand, there was striking discontinuity 
in the means by which they sought to maintain this influence. 
From 1955 onwards - and, to a lesser extent, during the late 
1940's - the Vietnamese communists showed that they were 
prepared to neglect their relationship with the Khmer 
communists in order to form advantageous alliances with non-
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communist figures in Kampuchea. Throughout this period the 
Vietnamese were guided by what they considered to be the best 
interests of the Vietnamese revolution: they felt that the 
subordination of the Kampuchean communists' cause was 
justified by what they considered to be the objective realities 
of the Indochinese war. The Kampucheans would just have to 
wait until victory had been achieved in Vietnam. However, as 
Heder has said,
promoting nationalism outside of Vietnam 
and at the same time defining Vietnam as 
the vanguard (was) bound to lead to 
trouble. (53).
The Kampuchean communists were to look back on this period as
(54)one of repeated betrayals.
By 1963 the WPK was a divided party. The majority of its
veterans had either abandoned the struggle or were leading a
life of exile in Hanoi: those who went to North Vietnam were
to be used, years later, in a Vietnamese attempt to regain
control of the Kampuchean revolution. Back in Phnom Penh,
the Party had come under the control of a group of
inexperienced extremists who did not embrace the principle of
international co-operation with as much warmth as their
predecessors had: these "second generation" Kampuchean
communists were already beginning to realise that their 
«
interests were at odds with those of their Vietnamese brethren. 
Under the leadership of Saloth Sar - soon to change his name 
to Pol Pot - this group.began to consider their options.
CHAPTER 1
1 9 6 3 - 1 9 6 6
In May 1963 - only months after assuming the leadership
of the WPK - Pol Pot left Phnom Penh for the countryside. He
was accompanied by Ieng Sary, by then a member of the party
Politbüro. Son Sen, another politburo member, went underground
in Phnom Penh at the same time, and followed the others a year
l a t e r . ^  Over the next few years a considerable number of
party members joined these men in the maquis. The Kampuchean
revolutionary struggle, as it developed from this time onwards,
owed little to the experiences of the Issarak period. With
(2 )ninety per cent of the central committee m  the countryside, 
party congresses were impossible to organise, and consequently 
policy was decided by a handful of people - the party "centre"
- who belonged to a new generation of Kampuchean communists.
If one accepts the version of events put forward by the 
CPK more than ten years later, this exodus marked a significant 
point in the breakdown in relations between the Kampuchean and 
Vietnamese parties. According to the CPK, these departures 
resulted from a deliberate decision: that the party should 
begin to prepare the peasantry for armed struggle against the 
Sihanouk regime - a policy which clearly clashed with the 
Vietnamese communists' strategy for Kampuchea. As Serge 
Thion notes,
It is tempting to date the real rupture 
from this period - by which I mean the 
Khmer communists' decision for a political 
line deliberately contrary to what Hanoi 
wished. (3).
The CPK has alleged that this decision was made as early as
1960 - at the Second National Congresé, where the party "took
(4)up the task of mobilizing the masses":' ' while some party
members were asked to continue to work in the open, "in the
(5)guise of representatives of parliament or functionaries",
3others were put vin charge of "clandestine operations to promote
/ c \the mass movement". '
This retrospective version cannot be relied upon: the 
leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were clearly prepared to 
re-write history in order to show that, since its "inception" 
in 1960, the CPK had pursued an independent program which was
f 7 )consciously opposed to the recommendations of the Vietnamese. 
However, a number of scholars have described the departure
/ o \from Phnom Penh as a deliberate anti-Sihanouk move ' -
something which the VWP would certainly have condemned.
According to one writer, the Kampuchean communists believed
that Sihanouk's anti-imperialism was "shaky", and that his
opposition to communism within Kampuchea might, by
strengthening the hand of the right, bring about some sort of
(9)American takeover. To the WPK, Sihanouk's nationalist
image was also a problem. As will be seen, during the 1960s
the movement sought to minimize Sihanouk's contribution to
the pre-1953 struggle for independence. The communists may
have decided in 1963 that, if they were to be seen as the
party which represented the nationalist aspirations of the
Kampuchean people, it was necessary to discontinue the
practice of competing with Sihanouk on his home ground - 
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that is, through legal political means.
Nevertheless, even some of those commentators who accept 
that the departure of the Pol Pot group was motivated by a 
belief that the party should begin to direct the organisation 
of peasant opposition to the Sihanouk regime maintain that a 
lot less thought went into the decision to leave Phnom Penh 
than the CPK would have us believe. Heder "presumes" that 
this decision was actually made in 1963. A 1973 history
published by the CPK's Eastern Zone "military political
service" supports this view. According to this document, the
1963 "congress" was opened to "approve a decision for a new
operational direction". Elizabeth Becker - who agrees
that the Kampuchean communists "abandoned their policy of
tying their hopes to an Indochina wide struggle" in 1963 -
claims that the party leadership was influenced by student
riots which took place in Siem Reap and other centres early
(12)in 1963. According to this argument, these developments
convinced the WPK leaders that they had underestimated the
revolutionary potential within their own country. Fearing
that the students' actions were being co-ordinated by
rightist, anti-Sihanouk politicians, the Kampuchean communists
felt that they had little choice: "they either moved in or
(13)abdicated leadership".
Unfortunately, Becker provides no evidence to substantiate
her assertions. It must also be noted that the unrest of
early 1963 took place in Kampuchea's cities: the fact that
the Khmer revolutionaries devoted little attention to the
development of an urban base over the next ten years -
(14)despite claims made by Pol Pot in 1977 - prevents
unreserved acceptance of this interprétation. However, the
argument? that the WPK was in fact reacting to events which
were beyond their control is worth pursuing. There is a
body of opinion which holds that it was simply Sihanouk's
repression which drove the party leaders into the jungle:
the suppression of the Pracheachon 
group and the anti-leftist campaign 
throughout 1962 convinced party leaders 
that they should disappear. (15) .
On March 8th 1963 Sihanouk published a list of 34 subversives
- which, as Kiernan points out, was almost entirely made up
of leftist urban intellectuals. Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and
Son Sen were included on this list. Becker maintains that
this - linked with the recent murder of Tou Samouth -
convinced the Pol Pot group that Sihanouk's police knew a
(17)great deal about them. The question of Tou Samouth's
murder is, of course, a moot point, and in any case, Pol Pot
has acknowledged that he had little reason for concern:v '
in a 1978 interview he remarked that, at the time of his
departure, the authorities were unaware of his position within 
(19 )the party. However, it remains a possibility that Sihanouk'
list convinced Pol Pot and his comrades that they.should 
continue their activities in the countryside, where greater 
secrecy could be maintained.
Although it is likely that it was a combination of all 
these factors which convinced the WPK leaders to leave Phnom 
Penh, this matter will remain unresolved due to a lack of 
contemporary evidence. However, this lack of evidence, 
combined with the abundance of alternative theories, makes 
one important conclusion possible: it is not necessary to 
accept CPK assertions that, in 1963, the party embarked on a 
deliberate, carefully thought out program which they knew to 
be directly contrary to the wishes of their Vietnamese 
comrades*.
Thiounn Mumm, who admits that he didn't understand the
decision to leave Phnom Penh, has asserted that
The 1963 move was done without anyone's 
approval. The Vietnamese did not 
approve, nor did anyone else. It was 
just as in the case of our party 
formation. (20).
In fact, Thiounn Mumm was probably not in a good position to
(21)know, for he was in Paris m  1963. If the VWP was
concerned that the WPK seemed to have abandoned urban-based
peaceful political struggle, they did not show it at the time.
There is no specific mention of these departures in any
available Vietnamese documents. There are, however,
references to what the Kampuchean communists did after they
left Phnom Penh. These activities demand close attention.
After leaving Phnom Penh, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary first
moved to the Kompong Cham region, near the border with
(22)Vietnam. According to Becker, this location was chosen
because "contact and co-operation with the Vietnamese would
(23)be easier". By 1964 Pol Pot and other members of the
WPK centre were apparently enjoying the hospitality of the
NLF, at "Office 900" in the South Vietnamese province of
(24)Tay Ninh. Here, the Vietnamese and Kampucheans are
reported to have enjoyed quite amicable relations. Years 
later, Vorn Vet recalled that "the Vietnamese protected the 
office completely
A 1965 CIA report noted that photographic evidence had 
recently revealed
a concentration of newly constructed 
huts in the extreme North-Eastern 
salient of Cambodia. (26)
This was probably the new headquarters of the WPK, which Pol
Pot estáblished in the North-Eastern area of Ratanakiri at
(27)about this time. There are a number of possible reasons
why this region was chosen. To begin with, it was sufficiently
remote for there to be little danger from Sihanouk's security
forces. Also, there was a considerable amount of revolutionary
potential in Ratanakiri:
the sparse population was composed mostly 
of impoverished hill peoples ... who had 
for some time been the victims of heavy
7handed and chauvinistic treatment 
by the Sihanouk regime. (28).
Kiernan notes that, rural unrest was growing in the North East
at this time, due to soil exhaustion, the diminishing size of
( 29 )family holdings, and "land grabbing" by landlords.
Finally, as Serge Thion points out, this was the area where
the Ho Chi Minh trail came into K a m p u c h e a . T h e  same CIA
report observed that
improved trails link the area to the 
Laotian infiltration complex, 
strongly suggesting that the activity 
is not of Cambodian origin. (31).
Although the Americans' conclusion was probably incorrect, 
it is certainly true that the WPK had established its head­
quarters in an area where access to North Vietnam and 
communist-controlled zones in Laos and South Vietnam was 
relatively easy.
The WPK centre was apparently keen to maintain contact
with the Vietnamese communists. It does not necessarily
follow that relations between the two organisations were not
strained. Indeed, both parties probably believed that it was
in their own interest to maintain this contact: the
Kampucheans required material support from the Vietnamese,
and the Vietnamese would have been keen to continue exerting
a contrólling, stabilising influence on WPK activities.
However, the fact that the Pol Pot group was so evidently
intent on keeping the lines of communication open casts some
doubt on Heder's assertion that, at the time,
Pol Pot was anti-Vietnamese ' because they 
were the greatest threat to his position 
of leadership in the party organisation ...
(and) represented the greatest threat to 
an essential (sic) independence of the 
Cambodian revolutionary movement. (32).
6The CPK has not denied that the two parties were in
contact with each other during this period. However, they
do claim that relations were strained by the Vietnamese
communists' subversive activities. In 1978 the leaders of
Democratic Kampuchea published their Black Paper, which is
subtitled "Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and
Annexation of Vietnam against Kampuchea". According to this
and other CPK documents, the Vietnamese communists - alarmed
by the "vigorous" development of the Kampuchean movement -
constantly opposed the activities of the Khmer communists
during the early 1960s, forcing them to "struggle on the 
(33)outside". The Vietnamese apparently made it clear that
they disagreed with the Khmers' class analysis, arguing that
Kampuchea had not yet reached "the stage of a society divided 
( 34 )into classes". They also condemned the WPK strategy of
(35)"waging armed and political struggle in combination". In
fact, the Vietnamese apparently made a direct attempt to
replace this strategy with one of their own:
They elaborated a political line for 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea and 
handed over this document in the 
Vietnamese language to the leaders 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. (36).
This Vietnamese document - "conspicuous for its confusion" -
is reported to have ignored class conflict and the struggle
(37)against U.S. imperialism. The Black Paper also asserts
that, in 1964, angered by the Kampucheans' unwillingness to
accede to their demands, the VWP "broke out" against the WPK,
( 38 )accusing it of being "adventurist and leftist". After
this, they allegedly sought to use every means within their 
power to bring about the destruction of the Kampuchean 
movement by organising a network of pro-Vietnamese Khmer
Qcommunists, who "created troubles and disorders" wherever they 
„ent.<39>
At times, the Kampucheans* allegations became ridiculous.
In 1977 Hu Nim was forced to "confess" that during the mid
1960's - acting as a double agent for the Americans - he
formed a "Marxist-Leninist CIA party" in K a m p u c h e a . H e
also admitted that, while he was carrying out these "traitorous
activities", he was in contact with members of the Vietnamese
party, who were apparently organising a similar group in
(41)North-Eastern Kampuchea. The objectives of these two
subversive organisations were the same: "revisionism",
"negotiations with the enemy", and "the building of a
(42)capitalist state". 1
Although the Vietnamese communists have made a number 
of general allegations concerning the allegiance and
(43)activities of their Kampuchean counterparts during the 1960s,
they have never directly responded to the Khmers* accusations.
However, they have made it quite clear that they were
opposed to the WPK strategy of pursuing armed and political
struggle against the Sihanouk regime. Vietnamese party
sources are reported to have acknowledged that
the difference between the two party 
"lines" became clearer when in the 
(Vietnamese) communists' phraseology,
"U.S. imperialism became the direct 
enemy of the Cambodian people, and 
Sihanouk held high the banner of 
national independence. While the 
(Vietnamese) line favoured promoting 
Sihanouk, the other line, led by Pol 
Pot, opposed this. (44).
Implicit in the Kampucheans' allegations is the idea that 
the Vietnamese communists were alarmed by the progress of the 
WPK's activities. Relations would indeed have been strained 
if the Vietnamese had truly felt that the Khmers were
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successfully developing a rural revolutionary base of their 
own which might threaten the increasingly important under­
standing the VWP had with Sihanouk. It is quite clear that, 
during their first two or three years in the countryside, the
Pol Pot group began to make at least some preparations for a
(45)peasant-based revolution. However, there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that, contrary to CPK claims, the
development of the Kampuchean revolutionary struggle did not
take place in a deliberate, concerted manner.
The CPK has asserted that, during this period, the
Kampuchean party was transformed into
one which now played a leading role in 
the revolution, which had a solid 
revolutionary position. (46).
(47)The struggle was said to be "most seething" in 1964. '
Despite the fact that many cadres were arrested, tortured and 
killed,
the surviving comrades continued to carry 
out their activities, to strengthen and 
expand our defence forces without letup. (48)
Indeed, it has been claimed that the WPK became "master of the
(49)country" well before 1966¡ and that the Vietnamese had,
"lost control of the revolutionary movement in Kampuchea" by 
the mid 1960*s.^^
Acqording to a 1975 edition of Revolutionary Flag - the
internal party magazine of the CPK - a revolutionary army began
to develop soon after 1963. However, the tasks of this "secret
defence force" were simply to
defend the revolutionary bases, to 
provide protection for roving cadres 
and to stand guard at various meetings 
and conferences. (51) .
In other words, this force was not involved in a war of 
national liberation. The Annotated Party History acknowledges
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that this was not a period of consistent development:
the order of the revolutionary struggle 
and the fury and bitter struggle against 
the enemy regressed... and became very 
passive in a few places and during 
certain periods of time. (52).
It adds, rather self consiously, that
another important point (about the 
1960-1967 period) was the fact of 
having launched once and for all an 
absolutely revolutionary movement, 
whether the movement is large or 
small.(53). (my emphasis)
If the Kampuchean revolutionary movement became "master of 
the country" during this period, this fact escaped the notice 
of the western intelligence services. According to the CIA, 
there were no signs of a separate Khmer insurgency in 
Kampuchea in 1965.
The Kampuchean communists' activities would have given 
the VWP leadership little immediate cause for concern. For 
this reason, retrospective claims that a serious rift 
had already emerged between the two movements by the mid 
1960's must be treated with caution. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communists' interests had 
begun to diverge. This divergence was increased by tensions 
generated by the Vietnam war. These external forces - and 
particularly Sihanouk's response to them - demand careful 
examination.
Prince Sihanouk seemed to have taken a conscious "step
to the left" during the early 1960's. On the 1st of August 1963,
the Phnom Penh regime severed diplomatic relations with South
Vietnam. On November the 10th, at Sihanouk's urging, the
Kampuchean government decided to nationalise all banking and
foreign commerce. In the same month, the U.S. military mission
(55)was expelled and all American aid was renounced. In his
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memoirs, Sihanouk explained the motives behind this move:
I decided to make a clean break. I 
felt the terms were so onerous that 
they amounted to national humiliation, 
and that dollar aid actually retarded 
our development. (56).
In Hanoi, news of these developments was no doubt greeted as
confirmation of the wisdom behind the Vietnamese communists'
campaign to improve relations with Sihanouk. This campaign,
which had entered a new phase in May 1963 - when the North
Vietnamese government recognised Kampuchean sovereignty over
(57)certain islands in the Gulf of Siam - was considered 
essential for
encouraging Sihanouk's anti-Americanism 
and anti-Diemism, and thus protecting 
the flank of the struggle to liberate 
South Vietnam. (58).
According to Pol Pot, however, the rejection of U.S. aid 
was a result of
the struggle waged by (the Kampuchean
people) ... This was a momentous
event in the struggle of the people. (59).
It is certainly true that the developments which took place
in 1963 provided the CPK with "momentous" opportunities. As a
result of Sihanouk's measures, the Phnom Penh government
struggled to increase export earnings - particularly in rice -
over the next few years. The average price offered to
rice producers fell by 20% between 1963 and 1964, thus
considerably reducing peasant incomes. Rice production
stagnated and a general economic crisis e m e r g e d . A s  Heder
has noted, this crisis
drew the CPK deeper into involvement with 
peasant grievances against the Sihanouk 
regime, and improved the prospects for 
organising the peasants. (62).
In addition, the measures introduced by Sihanouk in 1963
threatened to undermine the Khmer communists1 radical 
/ 6 3 ) vposition. In response to this threat, the WPK leaders
began to cultivate the development of an anti-Sihanouk, 
nationalist image: the party began praising the pre-1954 
struggle of the Issaraks, saying that independence had 
actually resulted from this struggle rather than Sihanouk's 
efforts. The Prince was, of course, outraged.
Such activities, which Sihanouk might blame on Vietnamese 
communist subversion, threatened to undermine VWP efforts to 
improve relations with the Phnom Penh government. Sihanouk's 
moves thus sharpened the conflict of interests between the two 
parties. While it was in VWP interests that the Kampuchean 
party should "try to be more flexible in searching for 
tactically expedient ways to co-operate with Sihanouk", 
the WPK - if it was to survive as an independent entity - had 
little choice but to focus its struggle against the Phnom Penh
r o  - r n o  < 6 6 >regime.
Meanwhile, the war in South Vietnam was escalating. The
Viet Cong stepped up their activities, and the Saigon regime
became more and more dependent on American support: by 1965
United States forces had become directly involved in the war.'
In 1964 Sihanouk's relations with the United States
deteriorated even further, mainly as a result of American and
South Vietnamese attacks on the Viet Cong in the region
(68)
(67)
bordering Kampuchea and Vietnam. At the same time,
Sihanouk's relations with the DRV and the NLF, which condemned
(69)these attacks, 'improved. In February and March 1965 
Sihanouk hosted a "Conference of the Indochinese Peoples" in 
Phnom Penh. The "Fatherland Front" of North Vietnam, the NLF 
and the political wing of the Pathet Lao were represented.
l¿
í 71)Of course, the Khmer communist movement was not, ^3\mong other
things, the conference called for the re-convening of the
Geneva Conference in order to guarantee Kampuchea's 
(72)neutrality. The extent of the Vietnamese communists'
commitment to the Phnom Penh regime is reflected in a 1965 Lao
Dong directive, which emphasized the importance of respecting
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sihanouk's
Kampuchea: this document also denounced American and South
(73)Vietnamese violations of this integrity. Meanwhile, the
repression of the Kampuchean left wing by Sihanouk's security 
forces increased. In Kiernan's words, "violent repression 
became the norm."
By 1965, the year Sihanouk finally severed diplomatic
relations with the United States, the border regions of
Kampuchea had taken on considerable importance for Vietnamese
communist strategy. With the escalation of U.S. involvement
in South Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh trail network increased in
value as a supply route, and the Viet Cong began to establish
(75)"sanctuaries" on Kampuchean territory.
According to the CPK,
when (the Vietnamese communists) came 
back to Kampuchea in 1964, they 
resumed their activities in the same 
objective. (76).
- that is, their objective to annex Kampuchea. The Viet Cong 
allegedly
extended more and more their penetration, 
using if necessary corruption. In 1965 
there were 150,000 Viet Congs settled in 
Kampuchea, at 2 to 5 kilometres deep 
from the borders. (77)
The Black Paper expresses resentment over the motives behind 
the Viet Cong presence:
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Those who did not know reality thought 
that the Viet Cong had come (to help) 
the Kampucheans' revolution. In fact, 
they had no more territory at home, in 
South Vietnam. (78).
The Vietnamese had no reason to assist the Kampuchean
revolutionaries. Even if Sihanouk did not publicly approve
of the Viet Cong presence, their relationship with the prince
(79)guaranteed their use of Kampuchean territory.
Kiernan maintains that, by the end of 1965, these 
developments had
driven the bulk of the Khmer communist 
movement into dissidence with the 
strategy of the Vietnamese party. (80).
Although certain Kampuchean leftists continued to follow
Vietnamese recommendations by pursuing the struggle through
the existing political framework after 1965,v 1 events which
unfolded on the other side of the South China Sea in that year
did nothing to convince the WPK centre of the wisdom of this
strategy. The impact which the destruction of the PKI in
Indonesia had on the outlook of the Kampuchean communists is
revealed in one CPK document:
If our analysis had failed, we would have 
been in greater danger than (the communists) 
in Indonesia. (82)
The clash of interests between the WPK and the VWP came
to the •surface in the summer of 1965, when Pol Pot and other
leading Kampuchean cadres went to Hanoi. During their visit
to North Vietnam - which is reported to have lasted "a few
(8 3 )months" - formal liaison was established with the VWP: 
this was the first time the leaders of the two parties had met 
face-to-face. According to CPK sources the Vietnamese 
delegation, which was led by Le Duan, called on the Khmers to 
renounce military struggle. Le Duan allegedly presented
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a document which pledged that
when Vietnam had achieved the victory, 
it would come to liberate Kampuchea. (85).
A Vietnamese source agrees that the VWP delegation tried to
convince the Kampuchean communists to "support Sihanouk while
criticising him, and maintain a political but not a military
struggle". ' According to the Black Paper, even though the
debate over this issue was "very keen", the WPK did not bow
to Vietnamese pressure.' ' As Porter points out, the terms
of the debate between the two parties were to remain unchanged
until 1970. (88)
The two delegations were apparently able to agree that
Vietnamese communist forces should be allowed to continue to
take refuge in zones under the control of the Kampuchean party,
and that in return the Khmer revolutionaries should be permitted
refuge in South Vietnamese areas under the control of the 
( 89 )NLF. Pol Pot's group also held meetings with "Cambodian
comrades resident in H a n o i " - the old guard of Khmer
communism, led by Son Ngoc Minh, which had spent, the ten years
since the Geneva Conference in North Vietnam. Nothing seems
to have been resolved at these meetings, however» Chandler
points out that Pol Pot was either "unable or unwilling" to
(91)lure any of these men home.
It was probably during this visit that one of the more
fascinating incidents described in the Black Paper took place,
if it took place at all:
In 1965 the leaders of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea called HO Chi Minh 
"Comrade Ho Chi Minh". Ho Chi Minh 
himself and his circle turned ... 
crimson with rage. The Vietnamese wanted 
everyone to call him "Uncle Ho", for this 
appelation has a meaning closer to their 
ambition of being "Father" of Indochina.(92).
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Even if relations were not as tense as such retrospective 
versions claim, the Kampuchean communists would have been 
fully aware of the conflict between their own interests and 
those of their Vietnamese counterparts by the time they left 
Hanoi for Beijing.
At the time Pol Pot was in Beijing in 1965 Prince
(93)Sihanouk arrived on a state visit. Since Sihanouk's
renunciation of American aid, the Peoples Republic of China 
had been the Prince's main benefactor, supplying his regime 
with substantial military assistance and general economic
(94 )aid. The Chinese communists' policy on Kampuchea during
this period was, according to Heder, consistent with their
policies towards other South-East Asian countries, where they
encouraged a "high level of co-operation between anti-imperialist
(95)states and local communist parties". In fact, it has been
asserted that Chinese policy on Kampuchea was identical to that
(96)of the North Vietnamese. }
Kiernan maintains that, although the Chinese were likely
to have asked Pol Pot to refrain from outright rebellion against
the Sihanouk regime, the Kampuchean party secretary probably
received some encouragement in Beijing:
A party that was traditionally aligned 
f with Vietnam but whose leadership was 
showing signs of resentment was not to 
be ignored. (97).
Nayan Chanda agrees:
Even if there were no overt support for 
an anti-Sihanouk struggle, China might 
have backed Pol Pot in his differences 
with the Vietnamese. (98).
The Vietnamese communists have gone so far as to claim that
in 1965, after securing control of the 
Pol Pot clique, they (the Chinese) enjoined 
the latter to wage an armed struggle against 
the Sihanouk administration. (99).
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The VWP has alleged that this was done because the Chinese
were keen to prevent "every united action by progressive and
revolutionary forces in the world". The Chinese did hold
a banquet for Pol Pot and his comrades just before the
Kampuchean delegation left Beijing. During this banquet,
which a number of Vietnamese representatives attended,
Chairman Mao himself made a speech praising the efforts of
the Kampuchean party.^^1) According to Kiernan,
The Chinese message was clear: the 
revolutionary leadership of the 
Kampuchean party enjoyed their 
protection. (102).
Claims that China was seeking to drive a wedge between 
the Kampuchean and Vietnamese parties are based on the 
assumption that the Chinese were concerned about what they 
perceived to be growing co-operation between Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union. Although it is true that, by 1965, "the
world communist movement was beginning to disintegrate", 
there is little evidence to suggest that Vietnam was really an 
issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute at this t i m e . i n  fact, 
there is no concrete evidence to support retrospective claims 
that the Sino-Vietnamese rift began before 1968, when the 
failure of the Tet Offensive convinced the VWP to abandon 
Maoist revolutionary strategies :^^6) As one Vietnamese
f
document points out, the Chinese communists began to withdraw 
the "carrot of aid" in the same y e a r . T h e  Vietnamese 
communists were generally successful in carrying out a 
delicate "balancing act" - managing to retain the support of 
the Soviets and the Chinese - during the 1 9 6 0 ' s . O n  the 
surface at least, the Chinese and the Vietnamese were enjoying 
amicable relations in 1965.^^^ Even if there was little 
depth to this apparent friendship, it is unlikely that Pol Pot
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would have been aware that this was the case. He would have 
been hesitant to criticise the Vietnamese communists in front 
of those he perceived to be their loyal comrades, and so the 
Chinese leaders may not even have been aware of the developing 
anti-Vietnamese sentiment within the WPK at this time.
It is certainly true, however, that China was seeking to
create a separate Maoist bloc during the 1960's, sponsoring
anti-Soviet breakaway groups within a number of Asian
communist movements - for example, in Burma, Thailand and
Bengal. a  Vietnamese document maintains that
The Chinese authorities wanted to set 
up what they called the World People's 
Front under their control. (111).
This document quotes from a 1966 resolution of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) central committee.
It is necessary to set up a broad 
united international front against the 
U.S. imperialists and their henchmen - 
of course, such a front should not 
include the Soviet Union. (112).
China's willingness to receive Pol Pot thus probably had more
to do with Sino-Soviet rivalry - that is, with "cementing ties
to a South East Asian communist Party that could be expected
to be anti-Soviet" - than with fostering the development
of a rift between the WPK and the VWP.
Pol Pot's return to Kampuchea apparently had considerable 
impact on the WPK. In September 1966, at a meeting of the WPK 
central committee, the name of the Kampuchean party was 
changed to the Communist Party of K a m p u c h e a . ( C P K ) . Pol 
Pot had been thinking of this for somé time: he is reported to 
have outlined the question of the party's name when he was in 
Hanoi the year before.^115  ^ This change was of great 
symbolic importance: it raised the Kampuchean party
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semantically to the level of the CCP, and gave it a status 
superior to that of the Vietnamese p a r t y . i f  the 
Vietnamese were offended - indeed, if they were informed - they 
made no public response. By this time, according to CPK 
sources, the CPK leadership had recognised that there was a 
"fundamental contradiction" between the Kampuchean and 
Vietnamese revolutions. Sometime in 1966, having
"discerned the true nature of the V i e t n a m e s e " t h e  CPK 
apparently decided
that it could have only state relations 
and other official relations with 
Vietnam. (119).
The decision to discontinue party relations does not seem
to have elicited any response from the Vietnamese communists.
If the CPK really made this decision at this time, the VWP
was almost certainly not informed: there is no mention of
this development in any available Vietnamese document,* -
retrospective or otherwise - and the VWP evidently had a good
idea of what was going on in Kampuchea. One Vietnamese
publication notes:
In 1966, back from a visit to China,
Pol Pot issued eleven documents 
purporting to change the party's 
political line, substituting Marxism - 
Leninism with Mao Zedong thought and 
considering ... Vietnam no longer as 
' friends and allies but as enemies. (120).
Information which was provided by a " w e l l - p l a c e d " V i e t
Cong defector in 1973 indicates that the Vietnamese were quite
concerned about the state of relations with the CPK in 1966.
In that year, partially in reaction to what they perceived to
be close relations between the CPK and the CCP and partially
(122)to exercise a restraining hand on the CPK, the Vietnamese
formed a special unit called "P36"/^^ This unit, which was
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reportedly answerable to Le Duc Tho, aimed to
help develop (CPK) cadre, exploit 
propoganda themes, and give other 
assistant to the Cambodian party. (124) .
Most of the Khmer trainees who studied under Vietnamese
direction were actually from Kampuchea Krom, in the Mekong
delta region of South Vietnam.*125* According to Hem Samrin,
100s, 1000s of Khmer Krom cadres studied 
with us. They were sent back to South 
Vietnam after three or four years 
training. (126) .
It seems that the Vietnamese, frightened of endangering their 
relationship with Sihanouk, were not keen for their trainees 
to get directly involved in the Kampuchean struggle.
According to Vorn Vet's confession, shortly after Pol Pot's 
return the CPK
raised the line of ... preparing for 
armed struggle in the countryside. (127).
This claim is substantiated by contemporary evidence. In 1966
the Kampuchean communists were distributing leaflets which
proclaimed that
the aim of the revolution is the 
liberation of the people from the 
capitalists and the feudalists. To 
succeed it is necessary to use force. (128).
Pol Pot had evidently decided to actively seek out opportunities
to stir up the Khmer peasantry against the Sihanouk regime - a
f
clear rejection of the recommendations put forward by the VWP 
when he was in Hanoi.
In Serge Thion's opinion, the determining influence behind
these changes was
the version of Maoism which was 
vulgarised and "linbiaoized" by the 
Cultural Revolution in a late 
paroxysm of the Stalinist vulgate. (129).
It is true that the cultural revolution was beginning as Pol
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Pot left Beijing. However, according to Kham Teuan, who
attended a 9-day series of lectures given by Pol Pot in
Ratanakiri shortly after the party secretary's return, Pol Pot
was more interested in stressing the importance of self
reliance than in talking about the cultural revolution. Teuan
recalled that Pol Pot only mentioned China once, and that was
in a fairly dismissive way:
China is a big country, but it is not 
only us who are struggling. All over 
South East Asia people are taking 
responsibility. (130).
The main conclusion Pol Pot had drawn from his experiences 
abroad was that the Khmer revolutionaries would have to rely 
on their own resources. Indeed, the Annotated Party History 
maintains that one of the main "lessons" of this period for 
the CPK was that "it is (often) better to learn nothing from 
foreign experiences".
The acceleration of the Kampuchean revolutionary struggle
can be explained in terms of events which were taking place
within Kampuchea, rather than in terms of foreign influences.
In the 1966 elections, as a result of Sihanouk's decision not
to nominate candidates, political power went to the right wing,
(132)and on the 22nd of October 1966 Lon Nol became prince minister. 
Ieng Sary has asserted that this development forced the CPK onto 
the defensive:
In 1966 everything changed. The 
non-endorsement of election candidates 
by Sihanouk opened the door to the guns 
of the CIA, with the blessing of the 
extreme right wing Assembly, Then, an 
actual civil was was begun against us.
We had to answer their guns with our 
guns. (133).
The Phnom Penh government certainly stepped up its repression 
of the Kampuchean left after this election, but this repression
really only weakened those leftists who were engaged in 
peaceful political s t r u g g l e , t h u s  strengthening the hand 
of those who were committed to the destruction of the 
Sihanouk regime. However, as 1967 began, rural discontent 
was on the upswing in Kampuchea. This was to provide the 
Khmer Communists with an unprecedented opportunity to embark 
on their own, independent revolution.
It is possible to draw a number of conclusions from this 
examination of the period 1963-1966. To begin with, it was 
clearly diverging interests which caused alienation between 
the leadership groups of the Kampuchean and Vietnamese 
communist parties to develop during this period: by 1966 the 
Khmer revolutionaries understood that their own interests were 
no longer compatible with those of their Vietnamese counterparts. 
They were becoming aware that if there was ever to be a 
revolution in Kampuchea, they would have to take matters into 
their own hands.
However, the notion put forward by the leaders of 
Democratic Kampuchea and accepted by a number of scholars, that 
by 1966 the two parties were already fundamentally and 
violently opposed to one another, is unfounded. Although the 
Vietnamese would not have been pleased about the WPK leaders' 
removal from Phnom Penh (the most appropriate arena for anyone 
involved in peaceful political struggle), assertions that this 
departure was a deliberately calculated anti-Vietnamese move 
are based on flimsy evidence. Throughout this period, contacts 
and co-operation between the two groups continued: as long as 
the Kampucheans were not successfully organising an effective 
armed rebellion against the Sihanouk regime, the VWP was 
prepared to maintain this contact. Retrospective depictions
of this period as one of bitter feuding and treachery simply 
indicate that during the 1970's these two parties - like any 
enemies recalling a period of former friendship - could not 
avoid reading sinister meanings into what was generally quite 
innocent behaviour on each other's part.
Allegations that a third party - China - was seeking to 
widen the gap between the CPK and the VWP also appear to be 
groundless. If the Chinese communists were really playing a 
role, it was an indirect one: by the time Pol Pot left Beijing 
he had begun to see China as a potential counterweight to 
Vietnamese communist influence within the Kampuchean party. 
Since assuming the leadership of the Party in 1963 Pol Pot had 
been forced to be very careful in his dealings with the VWP: 
the Kampuchean party secretary was aware that if the policies 
he pursued alarmed the Vietnamese communists, there would be a 
reduction in the important support which they provided. The 
realisation that China might possibly be an alternative source 
of such support encouraged the CPK leader to pursue independent 
policies with increased confidence. By 1966 Pol Pot had 
apparently decided that in principle, the Kampuchean armed 
struggle should go ahead. Although preparations for this 
struggle became more concerted after Pol Pot's return, the CPK 
was not ‘quite ready to "fly in the face of history". Open
rebellion, which would be a flagrant display of the Kampuchean 
communist leaders' contempt for the policies recommended by 
their Vietnamese brethren, was not something to be entered into 
lightly. ^One must also remenber that in 1966 Pol Pot had not 
yet attained the tight control over the Kampuchean party which 
he so jealously protected as the leader of Democratic Kampuchea 
However, during the period 1967-1969 the Khmer peasantry 
finally forced the Kampuchean communists' hand.
2¿
CHAPTER 2
1967-1969
In March 1967 the peasantry of the Samlaut area in the
north western Kampuchean province of Battambang rose in
rebellion. This revolt marked the beginning of the most
extensive outbreak of rural violence in Kampuchea since 1954.
Prince Sihanouk said of these uprisings:
I have read somewhere that the 
fighting resulted in 10,000 deaths. (1)
This conflict, which Kirk has described as a "prelude in
microcosm" of the civil war which was to spread across
(2 )Kampuchea three years later, was to be the first real
baptism of fire for the CPK.
Meanwhile, the Chinese were embarking on their "Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution". The fervent cult of
Maoism which was generated at this time stressed the ideal of
revolutionary purity: for a time, Beijing's commitment to
insurgencies in South East Asia hardened, and the involvement
(3 )of overseas Chinese communities was sought. Just as the
first Samlaut rebellion was beginning in 1967, echoes of the
cultural revolution reached urban centres in Kampuchea, where
approximately five per cent of the national population were
( 4 )ethnic Chinese. Copies of Mao's Little Red Book were
widely distributed, and the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association 
played a leading role in anti-Sihanouk agitation which took
i
place in various schools (especially the private ones, two-
(5)thirds of which were Chinese) and universities. Alarmed by
these developments, Sihanouk banned all "Friendship Associations"
and accused the Chinese of supplying material for subversive
propaganda. ' He also asserted that China was playing a role
in the rural insurrection, remarking that
China indeed has the intention of 
promoting every manoeuvre which could 
bring about the fall of this country. (7) .
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At one stage, the Prince claimed to have evidence that the 
Khmer insurgents were reliant on China for material and 
ideological support.' 1
A number of scholars have accepted the view that the
Chinese were behind the rural rebellions.^ It has been
asserted that a deliberate decision by the CPK central committee
to declare "open war" against the Sihanouk regime led to the
outbreak of rural violence in 1 9 6 7 , and that it was Chinese
influence - particularly the inspiration provided by the
Cultural Revolution - which pushed the CPK centre "over the
edge into active revolution". This argument necessarily
involves acceptance of the theory that, by early 1967, the
leaders of the CPK were agreed that it was time to defy the
VWP openly: that the Khmer communists felt they were ready to
launch their own revolution.
However, this interpretation contains a number of
weaknesses. It has already been seen that there is little
substance to the view that Pol Pot was influenced by the
Cultural Revolution during his visit to Beijing, and it is
unlikely that the CPK was fully aware of the events and
ideological issues which were unfolding in China in 1967: Mao's
( it)works were difficult to obtain in the jungle. In fact, as
Kiernan *has noted, it is more likely that the CPK leaders saw
the Cultural Revolution as a threat to their own control of the
(13)Kampuchean revolutionary movement. Moreover, although one
CPK defector has claimed that "the events at Samlaut were
( 14 )prepared in advance", most Kampuchean party documents
recognise that the CPK centre was not involved in the first, at 
least, of these rebellions. One document maintains that, in 
fact, the Samlaut uprising of 1967 was a spontaneous reaction to
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nationwide contradictions, as well 
as the untenable state of the 
contradictions in that area itself. (15) .
A brief examination of the events which led to the outbreak of
the first Samlaut rebellion will support this assertion.
As a result of the economic "reforms" implemented in 1963,
the price offered to rice producers had dropped considerably by
196 7 . ^ ^  Consquently, many Khmer peasants either decided not
to grow any more rice than they needed for their personal use,
or to sell their produce to Chinese merchants who then sold it
to Vietnamese insurgents operating in South Vietnam or eastern
Kampuchea: the Viet Cong were prepared to pay in American
(17)dollars at international rates. With the aim of bringing
this illicit trade to an end, Lon Nol had instituted a rice 
collection system known as "ramassage du paddy" shortly after 
becoming prime minister in 1966. Under this system, rice was 
bought from the peasantry - forcibly if necessary - at the 
fixed government rate.
If anybody was likely to resort to rebellion in the face
of Lon Nol's ramassage, it was the peasants of Battambang
province, to whom Trawney might have been referring when he
wrote that there were regions in South East Asia where the
position of the peasantry was like
that of a man standing permanently 
up to his neck in water, so that 
even a ripple is sufficient to 
drown him. (19).
This region was exceptional in that it contained larger land­
holdings and higher degrees of tenancy than elsewhere in 
K a m p u c h e a . K i e r n a n  reports that, during the mid 1960's, as
a result of huge influxes of refugees from "Kampuchea Krom" -
(21)the Mekong delta region in South Vietnam - and the 
distribution of land titles to government cronies, "several
2 c
thousand" peasants in this area were dispossessed and forced to
pay rent for land they regarded as their own.' ' A succession
of bad seasons did not help to ease the peasants' plight: in
1966 the Mekong river rose higher than usual, thus considerably
(23)reducing the rice harvest.
The 1967 Samlaut rebellion actually broke out shortly after
Sihanouk had been absent from Kampuchea for two months, during
which time Lon Nol had been relatively free to put his policies 
( 24 )into practice. On the 2nd of April villagers in the
Samlaut area, enraged at their mistreatment by a military detail 
collecting rice, murdered two of their tormentors. On the same 
day, two hundred people marched on a nearby government-sponsored 
youth agricultural settlement, putting its inhabitants to 
flight and setting the buildings on fire. Over the next four 
days the rebels burnt two bridges, attacked a number of other
(25)military patrols and burnt down several houses in the region.
Although the actions of these peasants must clearly be seen 
as a desperate response to treatment which they considered to be 
particularly unjust - coming as it did in the midst of very 
difficult circumstances - there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that leftist agitators played a co-ordinating role in 
this uprising. Leaflets had begun circulating in this area 
late in 1966: these attacked Sihanouk and Lon Nol as "men of
f
straw" who had "sold out their country", condemned the
ramassage, and appealed to villagers to join the revolutionary
struggle. 7 However, it has been established that these
leaflets were distributed by former Issarak resistance cadres
in the region, who were acting without the approval - indeed,
(27)the knowledge - of the CPK central committee. 1 in fact, the 
"centre" was apparently surprised by the developments in
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Samlaut. As Pol Pot has acknowledged,
V
At that time the Party Central 
Committee had not yet decided on a 
nationwide armed insurrection. (28) .
These developments were evidently a pleasant surprise, however:
It was remarkable that they used 
knives, swords and hatchets as 
weapons and relied on revolutionary 
violence. (29).
Pol Pot has claimed that the CPK ordered that "Battambang... 
should temporarily postpone its plan".^^) Although it is 
unlikely that the CPK centre was really able to control the 
actions of local cadres and peasants to this extent, this 
assertion is worth careful examination. The decision to put 
the insurrection on hold was allegedly made so that the central 
committee could
examine and sum up the state of these 
contradictions and the possibility of 
the use of arms. (31).
Two stark alternatives confronted the Kampuchean party leaders
in 1967. They could go beyond preparing for armed struggle and
become actively involved in these peasant uprisings, or they
could continue to attach priority to the preservation of amicable
relations with the VWP. The fact that the Khmer peasantry had
been unwilling to wait for CPK leadership meant that this
decision could no longer be deferred. Pol Pot*s growing <
eagerness to pursue an "independent, self reliant"
revolutionary struggle evidently won out, for the CPK
apparently decided that the party should henceforth "launch
(32)both political and armed attacks".
The CPK has claimed that, as a result of the 1967 uprisings,
( 33 )the Vietnamese communists were "panic stricken" and that
later in the year, when the rebellion appeared to have been put
(34)down, "they were delighted and felt a bit relieved". The
Vietnamese certainly had reason to be concerned. The Samlaut
rebellion took place at a time when the NLF, faced with half a
million U.S. troops, was especially vulnerable to American
(35)rearguard moves via Kampuchea. In fact, it came just a
few weeks after the largest American operation of the war - 
Operation Junction City - had forced COSVN, the VWP headquarters 
in the south, out of Vietnam and into Kampuchea. The
possibility of American moves against this and other bases in 
Kampuchea was obviously a major concern for Vietnamese 
strategists. Sihanouk's value to the VWP was increasingly 
recited to h's highly publicised opposition to.American 
violations of Kampuchean territory, which contributed to the 
deterrence of such moves. At that stage, any shift in the 
Prince's position would have been a costly blow to the 
Vietnamese war effort.
In April 1967 the Vietnamese communists must have felt
that their fears of the possible effects of an armed Kampuchean
uprising had been completely justified. On the 7th of April
Sihanouk broadcast a warning to the VWP: referring to the
insurgents as "Khmer-Viet Minh", or as "Khmer Rouge",
Sihanouk proclaimed that
they came to attack not with their hands, 
but with rifles given them by their Viet 
Minh masters. (37).
Warning that "we shall be unfriendly to those who become
unfriendly to us", the Prince mentioned the possibility
of circumstances leading to a "deterioration of Cambodia's
(39)relations with certain socialist countries". Although
there may be some merit to Carney's argument that Sihanouk was 
merely trying to undercut popular support for the rebellion by 
"tarring it with the Vietnamese brush", the VWP could not
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help but be alarmed by Sihanouk's rhetoric.
Sihanouk was also able to use the Samlaut uprising as an 
opportunity to act against certain leftist elements within 
Phnom Penh. In the same broadcast, he claimed that captured 
rebels had
confessed that they acted on the 
orders of their big leaders in Phnom 
Penh. This confession indicated that 
their big leaders are certain high 
personalities residing in Phnom Penh. (41).
On the 22nd of April the Prince charged five prominent leftist
figures - Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim, Chau Seng and So
(42)Nem - with responsibility for the rebellion. The first
three, who Sihanouk said shared the most blame, were arguably ^
the most popular politicians in Kampuchea: they had been
successful in the National Assembly elections in 1966, despite
(43)the manoeuvering of the right. All five were ordered to
appear before a military tribunal. However, within a few
days Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan vanished from their homes and
fled to the maquis. Hu Nim followed them in October that 
( 44 )year. ' At the time, it was widely believed that all three 
men had been secretly executed by Sihanouk's security forces.
When rumours that they were still alive began to circulate
Ui)some time later, they were dubbed the "three ghosts"! It was «
not just these men who joined the maquis at this time, however.
According to Kiernan,
dozens of others on the left ... and 
at least 100 teachers, students, 
professors and workers left to join 
the mushrooming resistance. (46) .
(47)In the minds of these people, "the revolution was on the way", 
The Vietnamese communists thus lost their influence over 
those Kampuchean leftists who had hitherto been prepared to 
accept the VWP line that the Kampuchean struggle should be
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pursued through peaceful political means. By fleeing to the 
maquis, these Khmers were effectively accepting the position of 
the CPK centre: that the Kampuchean movement should develop 
the armed struggle by "basically adhering to the tradition of 
self-reliance",^^ rather than relying on other, more powerful 
communist parties.
The CPK's Annotated Party History claims that the CPK
played the role of leader in the 
revolutionary struggle, that is to 
say, conducting politics with support 
of arms ... since 1968.. (49)
(my emphasis)
In 1980 Son Sen - the leader of the Revolutionary Army of
Kampuchea (RAK).»told Ben Kiernan:
I have been a soldier since the very 
beginning. I have been a soldier 
since 1968. (50).
The "very beginning" of the CPK's policy of concerted armed
struggle actually took place on the 25th of February 1968, when
the party launched a nationwide uprising: this insurrection
. (51)has been described as "Kampuchea's Tet Offensive". The
Kampuchean communists have themselves described the way this
conflict developed:
Beginning with the example of 
Battambang, the revolutionary movement 
with politics supported by arms 
expanded brilliantly from province 
* to province. (52).
This version has been borne out by one independent historian,
(53)whose work is based on Kampuchean government sources. In
fact, Sihanouk himself referred to the "blow of 25th February"
as a "concerted operation", remarking-that "the same movement,
(54)the same tactics" were employed all over the country.
The CPK dates the founding of the RAK to these attacks:
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our party's secret defense forces, 
which were transformed into armed 
guerrilla forces ... thus became our 
precursory revolutionary army and 
started fighting the enemy in 1968. (55).
According to Sihanouk, however, the Khmer Rouge were not
conducting the revolutionary struggle on their own. In a
March 1968 speech the Prince claimed that recently captured
rebels had included some trained as cadres in Hanoi and one
ethnic Vietnamese s a p p e r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  he ordered these
( 57 )agents shot without the benefit of a trial, which makes
this contention difficult to prove. Although Sihanouk also
cited Vietnamese aid to hill tribes in revolt in Ratanakiri 
( 58 )province, there is no evidence to substantiate claims that
the NLF was lending support to the insurgency in the far north 
( 59 )east: Ieng Sary is reported to have told a 1972 meeting
in Albania that CPK forces actually clashed with the Viet
Cong in this area during 1968.^^
The CPK has denied that the Vietnamese communists
supported the Kampuchean insurrection in any way:
In the armed struggle from 1968 to the 
beginning of 1970, the Vietnamese did 
not help the Kampucheans' revolution at 
all. (61).
In fact, the CPK reportedly sent Keo Meas to Hanoi in 1968, to 
seek the support of the former Issaraks living there.v 1 When
f
the "Hanoi Khmers" - under strict instructions from the VWP -
refused to co-operate, Keo Meas apparently reacted angrily,
accusing Son Ngoc Minh of "becoming fat in safety while the
f 6 3 )party faithful were being liquidated".
CPK documents claim that "to have no outside support was 
no problem" . The handicaps imposed by the lack of
equipment and weaponry were, with difficulty, overcome by 
relying on the party's resources:
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Where did our revolutionary army get the 
weapons? We got them from the enemy or 
we repaired them and made them ourselves 
under the leadership of the party. (65).
According to Pol Pot, speaking in 1977, "despite all these
shortcomings we continued to advance".
One VWP history published in 1980 notes that in January
1968 the "soldiers and people of Laos launched a campaign in
(67)northern Laos", but fails to mention the campaign which was
launched in Kampuchea in the same month. Another Vietnamese 
document, which at least concedes that this conflict took 
place, remarks that, although "a large number of Kampuchean 
communists laid down their lives", this struggle had little 
chance of success, because "the population as a whole followed 
Sihanouk " . ^
Despite this retrospective nonchalance, the Vietnamese
communists were extremely concerned about this uprising at the
time, seeking to use their influence within the Kampuchea party
to reduce its effectiveness. Nguyen Van Linh was sent to
Kampuchea to persuade the CPK leaders against continuing the
armed struggle. VWP leaders apparently viewed the 1968
campaign as a deliberate effort to destroy the anti-U.S. united
front in Indochina and thus sabotage the Vietnamese communists'
war strategy. Nguyen Co Thach alleged in two 1978 interviews «
that the CPK's "hard line" against Sihanouk from 1967 on was
aimed at dividing the Prince from Vietnam.
Notwithstanding claims that the 1968 uprisings were
entirely successful because, this time,"we (the CPK) started 
f 71 )the attacks", the Phnom Penh regime managed to impede the
development of this direct challenge to its authority by
(72)capturing a large base camp in Battambang late in 1968.
However, rural dissidence continued to flare up over the next
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few years - as did the use of terror by the Kampuchean
revolutionary forces: in June 1969 rebels executed a number
( 7 3  \of centrally appointed officials around the nation. To the
CPK this period marked a particularly significant step in the
progress of the Kampuchean revolution:
without that test, without the war from 
1968-69 to 1970, we could have been in 
danger. Because without 1968-69 we would 
have had no experience of independence - 
mastery. We could have again fallen into 
the ways of the period of the struggle 
against the French. (74).
This last remark clearly refers to the policy of co-operation
with the Vietnamese communists.
In 1969, according to the CPK's Black Paper,
the struggle between Kampuchea and 
Vietnam reached its highest pitch:
"Friendship" and "solidarity" were 
only empty words. (75) .
If the tension between the leadership groups of the two parties
was close to degenerating into open hostility, this feeling had
not yet permeated down to the lower levels of the Kampuchean
party. At this time, according to one CPK cadre, the VWP was
considered to be
a friend, but an unreliable one.
Vietnam was not considered an enemy. (76).
Nor was anti-Vietnamese feeling spread evenly throughout the
various CPK zones. Regional party organs were, after all,
virtually independent, raising their own armies and formulating
(77)their own policies. In the Eastern Zone bordering South
Vietnam, the Vietnamese communists seem to have had some success
in impressing their views on the local leadership, which
delayed attacks on government forces for several months, only
( 78 )joining the rebellion in August 1968. In fact, during 1968
and 1969, Eastern zone cadres attended study sessions in NLF
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zones in South Vietnam. In 1969 So Phim - the CPK leader
of the Eastern zone - conducted lectures which emphasized the
importance of co-operating with the Vietnamese, displaying
portraits of Ho Chi Minh. The differences which would
separate the Eastern zone leadership from the party centre until
1978 had begun to emerge. By 1968, the National Assembly in
Phnom Penh was almost entirely dominated by conservative elements.
Fearing that the growth in the power of the right wing posed a
threat to his personal authority, Sihanouk had formed a "Counter
( 81 )Government" soon after the elections in 1966. This loose
collection cf left wing politicians did not last long and so
Sihanouk began to use such groups as the Royal Socialist Khmer
(82)Youth (RSKY) to harass the government outside the Assembly.v '
Alarmed by internal and external developments, and
frustrated by Sihanouk*s reluctance to allow others to share in
the running of the country, Lon Nol evidently decided that the
road to power lay in limiting the power of the Chief of State.
This issue lay at the centre of the 27th Congress of the
Sangkum in June 1969. When Lon Nol was asked to form a cabinet,
the general replied:
Only as premier, and not merely as a 
secretary to Prince Sihanouk. (83).
After extensive negotiations, Sihanouk bowed to conservative
pressure. Lon Nol was granted the right to select ministers
who would report to him directly, rather than to Sihanouk.
This was a very real coup for the prince*s conservative
opponents. The new government quickly set about reducing
Sihanouk's power even further. Late in 1969 Sirik Matak -
Lon Nol's deputy premier - despatched a memorandum to all
Kampuchean diplomatic missions abroad, instructing them to
Í 85 )report only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(79)
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In 1969 Kampuchean foreign policy took what the VWP must
«
have seen as a dangerous step: the United States recognised
Kampuchea's frontiers in mid 1969, and diplomatic relations
between the two countries were r e - e s t a b l i s h e d . S i h a n o u k
also seemed to be distancing himself from the Vietnamese
communists. In November 1968 the Prince had asked the
International Control Commission (ICC), which had been
established in 1954, to look into allegations of Vietnamese
(87)infringements of Kampuchean territorial integrity. 7
Although the drift of Kampuchean events in 1968-69 was
probably fairly clear to the Vietnamese communists, there is no
concrete evidence that they lost confidence in Sihanouk, or
re-assessed their attitude toward the CPK and its tactics. In
recent times the Vietnamese have claimed that the VWP central
committee, foreseeing that "the situation in Kampuchea could
become complicated",v 7 provided
specific guidance regarding our actions 
should the U.S. imperialists expand the 
war to Kampuchea. (89).
According to a 1969 Viet Cong document, however, the basic 
assumptions which determined VWP policy toward Kampuchea had 
not changed:
The Cambodian government still maintains 
diplomatic relations with us, because it 
knows that we have achieved great 
victories. Cambodia will always be our 
neighbour. Therefore it cannot break 
off relations with us. (90).
As late as February 1970, Lao Dong party leader Le Duan
reaffirmed that DRV policy was to respect Kampuchea's
(91)sovereignty and territorial integrity.
On the other hand, the Kampuchean communists have claimed 
that the CPK centre, observing the political developments taking 
place in Phnom Penh, deduced that Sihanouk's reign was coming to
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an end. In fact,^
the Central Committee of the CPK 
grasped the situation well and 
perfectly knew that the U.S. and 
Lon Nol were going to make a 
coup d'etat. (92).
According to this version, the CPK began to soften its
attitude towards Sihanouk, criticising those who had "joined
the maquis and attacked Samdech Norodom Sihanouk".
Deciding that Sihanouk should, for the moment, be treated as
an observer rather than a participant, the Kampuchean
communists then began to focus their attacks on "the U.S.
(94)imperialists and the traitor Lon Nol". According to the
Black Paper, this new policy was introduced so that, after Lon
Nol had staged his coup, the CPK leaders would find it
relatively easy to convince Sihanouk to join them in forming
a "National United Front". Although the CPK was in a better
position than the VWP to know what was going on in Phnom Penh,
such expressions of retrospective wisdom should be treated
with caution. However, it is interesting that the CPK have
claimed that they were prepared to use this insight for the
betterment of CPK-VWP relations.
Towards the end of 1969 a CPK delegation led by Pol Pot
went to Hanoi, where they apparently met with a Vietnamese
delegation composed of Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap,
(95 )and Nguyen Duy Trinh. The CPK has asserted that, at these
meetings, the Kampuchean delegation sought to convince the VWP 
leaders that an anti-Sihanouk coup was imminent, and that this 
would be a favourable development for the Kampuchean revolution, 
since Sihanouk would then join with the communists against the 
extreme right and the United S t a t e s . T h e  purpose of this 
line of argument was, according to Porter, to show that the
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VWP should begin planning for this eventuality by supporting
(97)the Khmer party's armed struggle. The Vietnamese, however,
were not prepared to concede that Sihanouk would be overthrown.
The Black Paper contends that during the meetings in
Hanoi the Vietnamese communists, with the assistance of Son Ngoc
Minh, sought to persuade the Pol Pot group to abandon the armed 
(98 )struggle. The VWP also tried to convince the CPK to
establish relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (GPSU). In response to the VWP's offer to arrange a
meeting with the Soviet ambassador to the DRV, the CPK leaders
allegedly replied that, although they "did not oppose" the
(99)Soviet Union, it "would be better to postpone it". ' Again,
it is unclear whether this is an accurate version of events:
Thiounn Mumm has said that "even before 1970... we had contacts
with the Soviets". However, the versions put forward by
the CPK and the VWP both indicate that the two parties could
find little to agree about. During the meeting in Hanoi,
according to a VWP document,
the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique ... 
demanded that the South Vietnamese 
liberation armed forces withdraw 
from their Kampuchean bases. (101).
The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea have alleged that, by the
time these meetings broke down, all pretences of friendship 
<
had been abandoned. In fact the Khmer delegates claimed to be
in fear for their lives:
The Vietnamese used open threats against 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and all 
the members of the delegation of the CPK 
were unanimous ... that they could easily 
(have resorted) to assassination. (102).
While the CPK delegation was in North Vietnam, Sihanouk
arrived in Hanoi, to attend Ho Chi Minh's funeral. During this
visit the VWP leaders continued their efforts to cultivate
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S i h a n o u k . N e i t h e r  the Vietnamese communists nor Sihanouk 
would have imagined that, within a few months, Sihanouk would 
no longer be Kampuchea's Chief of State.
Once again, it is possible to explain increasing tension 
between the CPK and the VWP during the late 1960's without 
reference to the Chinese. Towards the end of 1967 the CPK 
leaders finally and irrevocably decided that if they were to 
exert any control over the Kampuchean revolutionary struggle, 
they would have to pursue a policy of active, armed opposition 
to the Sihanouk regime. The Kampuchean revolution, as it 
developed from January 1968 onwards, was not in accordance with 
the Vietnamese communists' wishes. Over the following seven 
years, the Kampuchean party leaders were to be alone in the 
belief that their struggle against Sihanouk was separate from 
the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese communists, along with the 
Americans and Sihanouk himself, continued to feel that the two 
were inextricably linked.
After 1967, with the departure of so many moderate leftist 
figures from Phnom Penh, the VWP no longer had any real allies 
on the Kampuchean Left. The Vietnamese would henceforth have to 
rely on Sihanouk alone to protect their interests in Kampuchea. 
Unfortunately, it was becoming apparent by the end of 1969 that 
the Prince could no longer be relied upon to safeguard these 
interests. The Vietnamese communists' refusal to agree to the 
Kampucheans' demands that they modify their policy on Kampuchea 
and re-introduce substantial support for the CPK should not be 
attributed to an ignorance of developments in Kampuchea, 
however. If Kampuchea did indeed become a battleground in the 
future, the Vietnamese communist leaders hoped that their own 
military intervention would tip the scales within the 
Kampuchean party towards more orthodox communist leadership.
CHAPTER 3
On the 18th of March 1970, Sihanouk's conservative
opponents took advantage of the Prince's absence from the
country: the National Assembly voted to depose Sihanouk as
Head of State, and the Khmer Republic was declared under the
presidency of Lon Nol.^^ Although it is likely that Lon Nol
and his co-conspirators carried out this coup with at least a 
. . . (2)"legitimate expectation" that the United States would support
their new regime, there is little evidence to substantiate
Sihanouk's claims that the Americans were directly involved in
(3)the plot against him. Indeed, given Sihanouk's shifts of
policy towards a more pro-American position during 1969, the 
American government would have seen little reason to remove him.
Lon Nol's coup had a dramatic, polarising effect within 
Kampuchea. Less than a week later, the first peasant 
demonstrations against the new regime took place: the Prince 
still enjoyed an almost divine status in the eyes of many
(4)Kampuchean peasants - a status which Lon Nol could not usurp.
One historian has shown that these demonstrations were not
entirely spontaneous, however; that the Khmer Rouge played an
important co-ordinating role.^  On the other hand, many urban
Kampucheans - including a number of leftist intellectuals^ -
supported the coup. In fact, mainly as a result of voluntary
enlistments, the Khmer Republic's armed forces increased from
(7)35,000 to 150,000 during 1970.v '
According to a 1971 COSVN directive, the coup
created conditions for the Cambodian 
revolutionary movement to leap forward 
and strengthen the unity of the peoples 
of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in their 
struggles. (8) .
The Vietnamese communists have also asserted that, in 1970, the 
VWP leadership - immediately realising that the "U.S. puppet
forces" could now be defeated on the "Kampuchean battlefield"^
- quickly began to make "all-out efforts" to build up the
Kampuchean revolutionary movement. It is certainly true
that Sihanouk's deposition marked an important change in
Vietnamese communist policy towards Kampuchea. VWP leaders only
altered their policy because circumstances left them little
choice, however. As the CPK has pointed out, Sihanouk's fall
left the VWP with "no more cards to play" in Kampuchea:
Lon Nol was clearly not going to be as co-operative as Sihanouk
had been. In fact, within days of the coup the new Phnom Penh
regime cut Vietnamese communist access to Sihanoukville, which
the NLF had been using as a supply port. At the same time,
declaring that he would oust all Vietnamese communist troops
from Kampuchean soil,Lon Nol launched what have been described as
"futile" attacks against Viet Cong sanctuaries in the region
(12)bordering South Vietnam. Then, on the 30th of April,
U.S. president Nixon announced that American and South Vietnamese
troops were to move against these sanctuaries, claiming that
(13)COSVN itself would be destroyed that night. In response to
the combined offensive which followed this announcement,
( 14)Vietnamese communist troops moved further into Kampuchea.
(Years later, the CPK claimed that "ten thousand Viet Congs
(15)took refuge in Kampuchea ). Faced with these developments, 
the VWP had no choice but to pursue a policy of active 
opposition to the new Phnom Penh regime. Any objections that 
the VWP might previously have had to the revolutionary 
activities of the CPK were thus removed.
The coup immediately provided the possibility of VWP 
support for the CPK. The Kampuchean leaders undoubtedly 
welcomed this prospect. Captured documents indicate that the
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Kampuchean revolutionary movement was struggling to maintain
' (1 6 )its numbers by 1970, ' despite Pol Pot's claims that the
Khmer forces included "4,000 regular fighters and 50,000
(17)guerrilla fighters" at the time of Lon Nol's coup.
Although VWP assertions that the Khmer Rouge numbered "only a 
(18)few hundred" 1 in 1970 must be treated with caution, it is
unlikely that there were more than 3,000 effectives within
( 19 )the movement at this time. One CIA report comments that
these forces were "widely scattered, poorly equipped and 
poorly co-ordinated."^2^  This has led Becker to comment that 
Pol Pot was probably keen to maintain a good relationship with 
the Vietnamese communists "long enough to build up his own 
strength." 2^1^
Thus, in April 1970 it seemed that a coincidence of
interests might succeed in effecting a firm alliance between
the Kampuchean and Vietnamese movements. When one considers
that it was differing policies towards Prince Sihanouk which
had caused the rift between the two parties to develop during
the 1960's, it seems ironic that, in 1970, the success of any
new alliance between the CPK and the VWP largely depended on
Sihanouk's co-operation. Both the CPK and the VWP saw the
value in obtaining Sihanouk's support: the Prince's standing
amongst the Khmer peasantry promised to be particularly useful
in developing the revolutionary struggle against Lon Nol.
On the 19th of March - the day after the coup - Sihanouk
flew into Beijing. Coincidentally, Pol Pot's delegation was
already there, fresh from its rather tense encounter with the
VWP in Hanoi. Then, on the 21st of March, the VWP's Pham Van 
(22)Dong arrived. VWP and CPK sources differ as to the details
of the negotiations which took place between these various
LL
groups over the following few weeks. According to the 
Vietnamese,
Acting upon a suggestion by the 
Vietnamese Party, the leaders of the 
Kampuchean Party, up to then grim 
enemies of Sihanouk, finally came 
out in support of the Prince. (23).
On the other hand, the CPK's Black Paper claims that, through
the Chinese premier, the Kampucheans advised Sihanouk to
(24)"adopt an offensive position and not a defensive one" and
to
stand in the framework of a National 
United Front in order to gather the 
national forces. (25).
This was Sihanouk's only alternative, because
the democratic forces were already 
under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea. (26).
In any case, the net result of these negotiations was clear.
Following a declaration of "unreserved support" by Hou Youn,
Hu Nim and Khieu Samphan - representing the Kampuchean 
(27)leftists - and with the encouragement of the VWP, Sihanouk
(28)"raised his banner of anti-U.S. struggle", drawing up a
program of resistance to the Lon Nol regime. In the words 
of the Kampuchean communists' Black Paper, the Prince 
proclaimed
the dissolution of ... Lon Nol's 
government and assembly, the founding 
of the National United Front, the 
Government of National Union, the 
National Liberation Army (and) the 
socialist construction (of) Kampuchea. (29).
Sihanouk's "Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea"
(RGUNK) was to be the official ruling body of the new united
front - commonly referred to as FUNK, its French acronym
(Front Unifie National Khmer). Rather than surrender the low
profile which they had enjoyed for some years, the true
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leaders of the CPK chose Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim and 
Thiounn Mumm to represent them in this organisation.^30^
An "Indochinese People's Conference" - attended by 
Sihanouk and the leaders of the DRV, the NLF and the Pathet 
Lao - met on the 24th and 25th of April. According to the VWP, 
this meeting was
very successful and signified a new 
developmental step in the history of 
the militant solidarity of the people 
of the three countries. (31).
Although the leaders of the DRV and NLF delegations - Pham Van
Dong and Nguyen Huu Tho - failed to mention the role of the
(32)pre-1970 Kampuchea struggle at this conference, the VWP
evidently recognised that a good relationship with the CPK was
to be encouraged. At an NLF conference on the 9th of April,
it was noted that
the Party of our friendly country 
(Kampuchea) has good experience in 
struggling and is closely co-ordinating 
with our Party to destroy the enemy. (33).
In mid-April, COSVN issued a directive that regional VWP
committees should activate groups to lend assistance to the
Kampuchean movement. Such groups were to
contact local organisations and friendly 
units for military help or for (armed 
propaganda) when necessary. (34).
As the year progressed, CPK forces were equipped with arms and
ammunition from North Vietnam.
However, relations between the two parties were not as
warm during 1970 as they appeared to be on the surface. It is
likely that VWP attitudes provoked a certain amount of
resentment amongst the CPK leadership. Although the Vietnamese
recognised that Kampuchea was the "most vulnerable point of the
(35)U.S. and their puppets" in the new "unified anti-U.S.
theatre", they continued to insist that South Vietnam should
be treated as
the main war theatre with the 
decisive bearing on the common 
victory. (37)
Shawcross remarks that, although the Vietnamese communists had
"finally embraced the cause of Khmer communism", there was no
reason for the CPK to expect that they intended it to "serve
any interests save their own". ' Indeed, the CPK's
retrospective accounts of the negotiations which took place
between the two parties at this time are particularly cynical
about VWP motives and intentions. The Black Paper claims
that, when the Pol Pot group stopped at Hanoi on their way
home from Beijing, the North Vietnamese leaders greeted them
( 39 )with "delirious joy and extremely warm embraces".
Remarking that this welcome was a "sudden change of 1 8 0°"^^
from the one they had received the previous year, this
document asserts that, in their dealings with the CPK delegation
the VWP leaders were motivated by nothing more than a desire to
control the Kampuchean people like 
they did during the fighting against 
the French colonialists. (41).
Although Pol Pot agreed to have Vietnamese communist
troops fighting alongside the Khmer Rouge, he was eager to
preserve* the essential independence of the Khmer movement.
During his stay in North Vietnam, he rejected Le Duan's
proposals for a mixed military command for the Kampuchean
struggle, pointing out that he could not make such a decision
(42)without consulting the CPK central committee. According
to CPK sources, the Vietnamese - who were "very unsatisfied(sic) 
with Pol Pot's responses - then resorted to deceit, hoping to 
trick the Kampuchean party secretary into agreeing to their
( 36 )
nproposals. When a telegram from Pol Pot arrived from CPK
deputy secretary Nuon Chea, the Vietnamese allegedly chose not
to pass on the first half of its text, which expressed concern
that the Vietnamese proposals might pose a threat to the
(43)"independence and sovereignty" of the CPK. The Black Paper
also claims that the Vietnamese leaders
deliberately told lies according to 
which Comrade Ieng Sary (had) already 
come to an agreement with the 
Vietnamese proposals and that he was 
only waiting for the decision of the 
Comrade secretary. (44).
Pol Pot was apparently not convinced: he "perfectly understood"
(45)that the Vietnamese were lying.
Of course, it is quite possible that there is little truth
to these allegations: indeed, such accounts may have been
written in an attempt to explain certain contradictions which
arose within the Kampuchean party leadership at this time.
However, there can be little doubt that the CPK leaders were
genuinely concerned that the Vietnamese communists posed a
threat to their control of the Khmer movement. Despite CPK
claims that the support the party received from the Vietnamese
(45)was only of "secondary significance", it was primarily the
VWP which was responsible for the rapid development of the 
revolution in Kampuchea in 1970. As Carney notes, the
t
Vietnamese "got a war underway in less than two weeks."
During 1970 Vietnamese communist troops stretched across
Kampuchea, playing a leading role in the war against Lon Nol
by taking charge of a great deal of territory. At the same
time, in accordance with an NLF directive that new "revolutionary
administrations" be formed in liberated areas, Vietnamese troops
established local political and military organs in regions under 
(49)their control.
The VWP has claimed that its only intention was to
firmly establish (the Kampucheans') 
revolutionary power and considerably 
strengthen their armed forces. (50) .
However, Vietnamese policies seemed to be designed to
counteract the influence of the CPK centre within the
Kampuchean revolutionary movement. A massive propoganda
campaign which the VWP launched in rural Kampuchea shortly
after the coup stressed the theme of loyalty to Sihanouk.
Ponchaud has recorded that
the Vietnamese wore badges representing 
the deposed prince, whom they swore to 
return to power. (51).
In what one observer has described as an "attempt to limit the
( 52)power of the domestic leadership of the CPK", Hanoi helped
to train and equip a force known as the Khmer Rumdoah (Khmer
Liberators) or Khmer Blanc (White Khmer), to distinguish them
from CPK troops, who were by now being referred to as Khmer
Krahom (Red Khmer) . The Khmer Rumdoah were apparently
centred in the Eastern Zone, where they were commanded by
(54)Chau Chakrey, a former monk. This group had a royalist,
pro-FUNK platform, and were in favour of full co-operation with
the VWP. A circular issued by one Vietnemese regional
committee stressed that all members
' must be patriotic workers who follow 
Sihanouk and the Cambodian Reunification 
Front. (55).
Moreover, trainees were to be indoctrinated on the
role and mission of the Front and the 
five-point declaration of Sihanouk. (56).
Perhaps in response to the emergence of the Khmer Rumdoah, the
CPK has alleged that, at this time, the VWP actually began to
organise a secret "parallel state power" in Kampuchea -
"particularly in the Eastern Zone for they had their agents
¿9
there". The Vietnamese also hoped to influence the Khmer
V
Revolution through the KPRP exiles who had been in North Vietnam
since 1954. More than a thousand of these "Khmer Viet Minh" -
eight hundred of whom were now nominal CPK members - returned
home from Hanoi along the Ho Chi Minh trail in 1970. ' The
CPK apparently did not object to the return of this group: one
of these veterans has said that "the parties of Vietnam and of
(59)Kampuchea decided to repatriate us". (my emphasis). This
may have been because the CPK was interested in isolating them 
from their Vietnamese "masters". In any case, these "Hanoi 
Khmers" received a less than friendly welcome on their return, 
as will be seen.
VWP documents maintain that during the early 1970's the
Kampuchean and Vietnamese revolutionaries enjoyed extremely
close relations, and that the Khmer population welcomed the
Vietnamese communists as saviours. Indeed,
Khmer mothers (were) just as affectionate 
and attached to Vietnamese troops as 
Vietnamese mothers. (60).
However, various sources agree that this was not, in fact, the 
case.
Fearing that when the revolution had been won the results 
would be credited to the VWP and Sihanouk, the CPK leadership 
quickly came to resent the part being played by the Vietnamese 
communists. In his memoirs, Sihanouk describes an incident 
which apparently took place in 1970. Certain leftist members 
of RGUNK, while visiting Hanoi, talked among themselves about 
Vietnamese hypocrisy, and the need for' Kampucheans to beware 
of
North Vietnam's desire for hegemony 
after (the) foreseeable joint victory 
over the Yankee aggressors and the 
traitor Lon Nol. (61).
(57)
These words were apparently reported to General Giap, who
complained to Sihanouk that
anti-Vietnamese remarks, made here in 
Hanoi, hurt us deeply, since every 
day our soldiers ... fight and die ... 
to save and liberate your country. (62) .
Relations between lower level Vietnamese and Kampuchean cadres
were not always easy either. Early in 1970 it was reported
that in Takeo province VWP-CPK feuding had delayed the
(63)installation of a new civil administration,v ] and by June
it was being reported that in Kratie province clashes were
taking place over whether Sihanouk's portrait should be
displayed. Furthermore, seven members of a CPK district
committee who had accepted Sihanouk badges from the Vietnamese
were reportedly shot at about this time. There is probably
some truth in the explanation which one U.S. intelligence
report offered for this behaviour:
The Khmers have always hated and feared 
outsiders, especially those who attempted 
to impose their political and social mores 
upon them. The problem is compounded by 
the fact that Vietnamese cadres must often 
rely on interpreters to state their case, a 
situation which leads to confusion and 
misunderstanding. (66).
However, it was soon to become clear that the Khmer 
revolutionaries' hostility towards their Vietnamese counter­
parts was being fuelled by a desire to assume total control 
of the Kampuchean revolution.
The VWP responded to this growing hostility by instructing 
cadres to treat their Kampuchean brethren with sensitivity.
One Vietnamese circular stressed that
we must avoid the impression that (regional) 
organisations are initiated by the South 
Vietnam Liberation Army or the "Viet Cong". 
We must make them realise that they are 
masters of their country. (67).
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According to another Vietnamese document, punishment of 
"wicked enemy personnel" was to be carried out by the Khmer 
revolutionaries themselves, and Vietnamese cadres should 
"avoid showing up during the performance". ' A VWP document 
which apparently emanated from a meeting between Vietnamese 
communist leaders and their CPK counterparts in October 1970 
directed that Kampuchean cadres and soldiers should be told 
that
when the liberation of the country is 
achieved, they will participate in the 
unified Khmer government. (69) .
The VWP also acknowledged that it would be advisable to
tell the ... people that the Cambodian 
revolution is led by the revolutionary 
party of Cambodia. (70) .
CPK cadres and leaders alike must have resented such
condescension. In another, even clearer expression of
assumed superiority, the VWP instructed its cadres to
absolutely avoid manifesting pride in 
coming from a larger country. (71).
In November further negotiations took place between the
(72 )leadership groups of the two parties. According to the
CPK, these talks were requested by the Vietnamese, who were
keen to discuss the differences which were hampering the
(73)development of true "solidarity and co-operation". The
I
VWP was represented by Nguyen Van Linh - then party secretary
for South Vietnam - and Tran Nam Trung, while the Kampuchean
(74)delegation included Pol Pot and Nuon Chea. The CPK
leaders reportedly requested that the VWP discontinue its
"undermining activities", and Pol Pot apparently refused
Vietnamese offers of further aid, pointing out that the
(75)Kampuchean movement was "totally self sufficient". In
1978 the CPK claimed that the Vietnamese were responsible for
a crude attempt to poison the Kampuchean leaders at this
(7 6)meeting. Although this account undoubtedly reflects
tension which existed at the time, it is clear that the real 
purpose behind this last allegation was to justify the
executions of Koy Thuon and Ney Sarann, which were carried out
(77)in 1977: according to the Black Paper, these two men were
( 78 )involved in the plot to assassinate Pol Pot and Nuon Chea.
By 1971 it had become clear that the VWP leaders were
responding to Kampuchean demands for greater independence with
what Ponchaud has described as their "customary political 
(79)realism". As one CIA report noted at the time,
The Vietnamese communists have 
apparently acceded to Khmer 
demands for autonomy. (80).
The same despatch observed that the Vietnamese communists
(81)were "attempting to maintain as low a profile as possible".
Meanwhile, the CPK was busy building up its own strength. In
1971 the CIA observed that the Khmer communists were attempting
(82)to complement the FUNK infrastructure with one of their own.
A report supplied by a CPK "rallier" indicates that a great
deal of secrecy surrounded the development of this CPK
infrastructure. This defector recalled that for every
"patriotic" association run by the Front, there was a
"democratic" association run by the CPK:
The associations which have the word 
"patriotic" in them are always overt ...
Those with "democratic" are usually run 
by the party and are covert. The people 
usually do not see the party even when 
they are looking right at it; they see 
only the front. (83) .
In July 1971 the CPK convened a Party Congress. The 
central committee was expanded, but no "Hanoi Khmers" were 
elected. Delegates were warned of the need to resist the
influence of the'Vietnamese communists: Vorn Vet reportedly
urged members not to allow the VWP to "draw the population 
(85)over". In fact, the CPK later claimed that this congress
approved a definition of Vietnam as the "acute e n e m y " . i t
was also explained to delegates that the party should begin
to implement "war communism" or the "National Democratic
Revolution" in areas under its control. This was to involve
a strict policy of population control, the evacuation of
urban centres, collectivisation of property and land, and the
(87)expulsion of ethnic Vietnamese. '
Meanwhile, the CPK centre was extending its influence
over the various regional party organs : Ta Mok1s South
Western zone began to become a firm stronghold for the party
(8 8)leadership at about this time. ^However, some regions -
particularly the Eastern and North Western zones - retained
their autonomy, remaining on good terms with the VWP. 1
Consequently, although the instructions issued at the 1971
congress were passed on to all zones, the results were uneven.
Indeed, the "National Democratic Revolution" was not implemented
in the Eastern zone until many years later. Nevertheless,
the Eastern zone delegates to the 1971 conference did support
the resolution to expel ethnic Vietnamese from CPK zones.
<
Moreover, they apparently also approved of a proposal that the
(91)Issarak returnees be purged. However, this did not prevent
the party leadership from alleging - several years later - that
Eastern zone leader So Phim had always preferred these
(92)"Vietnamese in Khmer bodies" to regulär CPK cadres. To
the Kampuchean party leadership, it seemed that the returnees
(93)"had not come to help, but to replace or destroy". As
one veteran puts it, they were looked upon as a "fifth column".(94)
f ■/
By early 1972 these northern regroupées, along with the Khmer 
Rumdoah, had come to be referred to as a "third force" by the 
CPK: the first and second "forces" were, respectively, the
(95)CPK itself and the Lon Nol regime.v These veterans had
apparently been warned that they would find the situation in
Kampuchea "delicate" before they left Hanoi: Son Ngoc Minh
reportedly advised them not to "made any demands at all", but
to "be happy with whatever tasks (they) were g i v e n " . I n
fact, despite assertions that the Hanoi Khmers played a 
( 97)"leading role" within the CPK during 1970 and 1971, most
of them were assigned to fairly unimportant positions within 
the movement: many were assigned dangerous combat roles, 
regardless of their experience or training.
According to Li Yang Due - one of these returnees - the 
campaign to minimise the influence of this group became more 
overt after the 1971 conference. 1 At a rally in 1972,
Hou Youn reportedly said that the "third force" - which was 
"not a force of the people's revolution" - was to be "pulverised 
completely". Those few veterans who had been given 
administrative tasks were progressively reassigned to military 
duties, where they were often given suicidal missions. Others 
were secretly executed by the CPK's State Security apparatus 
(Santebal).^^^ Li Yang Due was one of the many who were 
arrested in the middle of the night, and charged with being a 
"revisionist, a man of the "3rd force', and a servant of 
Vietnam".  ^ By the end of 1971 approximately half of these
veterans were dead. A few, realising their danger, managed to 
escape to the north west, where they survived until the 
nationwide purges which began in 1976. In the Eastern zone, 
Hanoi Khmers generally remained unharmed until 1974, when this
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region began to exhibit the patterns which were by then firmly
established in areas like the South West.^^^
Meanwhile, the CPK was beginning a terror campaign against
those Khmers who supported the Vietnamese communists. On one
occasion, when a group of Vietnamese communist troops left a
town, the Khmer Rouge
came and threw grenades into the houses 
of those who had sheltered the Vietnamese.
In some cases they killed the entire 
families, in some cases the head of the 
family. (104).
CPK verbal attacks on Sihanouk greatly increased friction
between the Khmer Krahom and Khmer Rumdeah rank and file, and
fighting between the two factions grew to be fairly common.
More significantly, the CPK began to attack the Vietnamese
communists themselves during 1972. A CIA report has described
an anti-Vietnamese demonstration which took place in Kompong
Cham in mid-1972. Villagers marched around, brandishing
machetes and shouting,
We all agree to die together in order 
to get the VC/NVA out of Cambodia. (106).
According to an eyewitness, "the demonstrators were not locals".
They had apparently been "educated in Red Khmer ideas".
Sporadic firefights between CPK and Viet Cong forces were
reported in "many areas of the country" during 1972.^^^ As
f
a protective measure COSVN instructed its troops in Kampuchea 
to travel together in large groups. When challenged at CPK 
checkpoints,
they were not to react against the 
Kampuchean communists but were to await 
the liaison teams who would then take 
the necessary actions. (109) .
As one VWP document puts it, the Vietnamese communists
by now had a
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clear feeling that the attitude of 
the Kapipucheans ' revolutionary 
leadership had changed. (110).
Indeed, by the end of 1972 the VWP had come to accept that
it had lost any influence it might once have had on the CPK.
Meanwhile, VWP priorities were beginning to shift to home
battlefields. Following the triumph over Lon Nol's forces
in CHENLA II, the Vietnamese communists turned back to
concentrate on the war in South Vietnam. The number of
Vietnamese communist troops in Kampuchea soon fell to below
8 , 000 . ( 112)
An examination of CPK rhetoric towards the end of 1972
reveals that the party was by now eager to project an
independent image. Quinn reports that the "Khmer Krahom"
began publicly disavowing Sihanouk's leadership at this time,
saying that he had "deserted the revolution", and was "taking
1,000 riels a month from the party's coffers" in order to lead
a luxurious life in B e i j i n g . A t  about the same time,
Hou Youn is reported to have declared that, although the VWP
"acted as if it wanted to take over the Cambodians", the
Kampuchea communists had "turned right around and were able to
act as (their) own masters". According to one report, the
Khmer communist party
proclaimed its existence ... and its 
rights of leadership through all 
vicissitudes of the struggle (115)
in September 1972. An anniversary ceremony was evidently held,
and a flag which had as its emblem "a hammer and sickle in the
centre of a blood red field" was d i s p l a y e d . V a r i o u s  CPK
slogans emerged, proclaiming the sovereignty and self reliance
of the Kampuchean party. One such slogan stated:
only the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
can lead the revolution to definitive 
victory. (117).
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In 1973 Ith Sarip maintained that the CPK had recently 
"bragged" that
it is absolutely not under the 
guidance of the Vietnamese 
communist party; it is equal to 
all ... communist parties and 
independent. (118) .
By October 1972, North Vietnamese and American negotiators
in Paris had reached an agreement on terms for a ceasefire and
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. Until mid-1972
the United States had insisted that, before any agreement could
be finalised, the DRV would have to guarantee that the
revolutionary forces in Kampuchea would also observe the
ceasefire. According to Porter, the Vietnamese delegation
rejected this proviso as "neither possible nor required under
the terms of the agreement However, it is clear that the
VWP relayed the Americans' demands to the Kampuchean party
leadership. In fact, according to the Black Paper, the
Vietnamese were quite eager for the CPK to enter into
negotiations with Lon Nol: they allegedly sought to "frighten"
the Khmer revolutionaries into arranging a ceasefire with the
( 122)Phnom Penh regime, by painting a gloomy picture of the
prospects for revolution in Kampuchea and emphasizing the threat 
posed by
the new effectives enlisted by the Lon 
Nol army, the air and naval pieces, etc., 
of the latter. (123).
The Vietnamese communists stressed that "according to their 
data... the enemy was powerful". Early in 1972 the VWP
apparently increased the pressure: Pham Hung, an important 
party figure, was giVen the job of convincing the Kampuchean 
communists to consider a c e a s e f i r e . L a t e r  that year, in 
response to CPK protests that they "had nobody to carry out
negotiations", the Vietnamese allegedly replied that
V
in our opinion, the Kampuchean comrades 
must negotiate. If the Kampuchean 
comrades have no cadres to carry out 
negotiations with the U.S., we can do 
it (in) their place. (126).
To the CPK, this offer clearly displayed that "Vietnamese
(12 7)impudence" was "boundless". ' The VWP also passed on
Kissinger's threats to bomb the Khmer Rouge into submission if
negotiations were rejected: the American secretary of state
reportedly asked Le Duc Tho to
inform the Kampuchean side that if 
Kampuchea did not ceasefire, the Ü.S. 
strategic and tactical planes would 
destroy Kampuchea within 72 hours. (128).
To the CPK leaders, it seemed as if it was the Vietnamese who
were making these threats. The Black Paper asks:
Did Kissinger really talk like this?
Probably. But anyway, the Vietnamese 
were involved in the affair. (129).
To Wilfred Burchett, such insinuations reflected
the low level and rabid anti-Vietnamese 
prejudice of the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary 
leadership (rather) than any realities 
of the situation. (130) .
However, given the steady deterioration of VWP-CPK relations
which had been taking place over the previous ten years, it was
inevitable that the Kampuchean communists would interpret
the actions of their Vietnamese counterparts in this way.
According to their own account, the Kampuchean revolutionary
leaders repeatedly refused to bow to VWP demands that they
negotiate with Lon Nol and the Americans. 1^31  ^ Even Sihanouk,
who had begun to make tentative references to the possibility
(132)of a negotiated peace during 1972, returned to a harder
(133)line after meeting with "in-country leaders". The CPK
leadership was apparently keen to generate support for their 
stance amongst the Khmer peasantry and lower level party cadres.
Late in 1972, Kuong Lumphon attended a mass meeting of
revolutionary forces somewhere in rural Kampuchea. At various
stages during this rally the crowd chanted "Reject I Reject I
Reject!" in response to the speaker's shouts of "Reject the
imperialist negotiations ! " ^
The Khmer revolutionaries were apparently unanimous that
they would not submit to Kissinger's threats:
our party, people and revolutionary army 
were not frightened. For the sake of the 
nation's honour, the nation's independence, 
we had to carry on the struggle. (135).
One writer has claimed that this obstinacy was
certaily due ... to the influence of 
Peking's perverse opposition to a 
negotiated settlement of the Vietnam 
war. (136).
However, the Vietnamese have themselves made a point of
highlighting the Chinese communists' eagerness to promote a
ceasefire on Vietnam: this would please the Americans and
thus assist their own campaign for rapprochement with the United
S t a t e s . A c c o r d i n g  to one Vietnamese document, Zou Enlai
actually said that
It would be best for Vietnam and the 
whole of Indochina to relax for some 
time ... in this period of relaxation 
the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and 
Kampuchea will carry out a policy of 
peace and neutrality. (138).
<
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Chinese were really 
involved in some Machiavellian plot to widen the rift between 
the two parties by secretly discouraging the CPK from 
negotiating. In any case, the Kampuchean's refusal to discuss 
a ceasefire can be explained without reference to the Chinese.
In response to VWP attempts to convince the CPK that to 
continue the struggle against Lon Nol without Vietnamese 
communist support would be a foolhardy venture doomed to
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failure, the Khmer communists replied that they "analysed the
situation differently". In fact, according to one CPK
account, the Kampuchean revolutionary forces were in an
extremely good position by the end of 1972: since 1970, the
proportion of people living in areas under CPK control had
allegedly "increased from 70% to 80% of the whole population"
By the end of 1972 the CPK leadership believed that "the
political situation in the whole (of) South East Asia" showed
it was in Kampuchea where the revolutionary 
situation was best ... If the map was 
coloured, black colour would be in every 
place, except in Kampuchea where red colour 
would dominate. (141).
It is certainly true that, by this time, the government in
Phnom Penh was foundering: the only thing preventing the total
economic collapse of the Lon Nol regime - already weakened by
corruption and public d i s c o n t e n t - was American aid.
Serge Thion believes that this was sufficient reason for the
Khmer revolutionaries' refusal to negotiate:
The CPK thought, not without reason, 
that the Lon Nol regime was collapsing 
from within and did not have long to 
go. Why give up on a sure thing? (143).
The Americans, who still believed the CPK to be a creature
of North Vietnam, refused to accept the line put forward by the
Vietnamese negotiators in Paris - that the VWP was unable to
deliver a ceasefire for Kampuchea: even several months after
the signing of the Paris Accords, in January 1973, the United
States was making it clear that
there would be no final agreement on 
(post war) economic assistance to the 
DRV unless DRV performance on Cambodia 
is satisfactory. (144).
Perhaps Shawcross best describes the false perception which 
those in the West had of the Khmer Rouge:
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All through the war diplomats and 
journalists at Phnom Penh dinners and 
cocktail parties spoke of "les autres" 
only in the vaguest terms. They were 
thought of as shadowy, insubstantial, 
inconsequential, wraiths almost, 
inhabiting that unknown, fearsome world 
"out there", where the bombs that shook 
the glasses actually fell. It was not 
until well after the war that the idea 
that the Khmer Rouge could in any way 
differ from actually be independent of, 
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong was 
entertained. (145).
What Western diplomats completely failed to understand was that,
by 1973, the leverage which the Vietnamese had once possessed
within the Kampuchean revolutionary movement had virtually
ceased to exist. As Thiounn Mumm puts it, by this stage the
Vietnamese communists and
the group of pro-Vietnamese traitors who 
were in the CPK and in GRUNK couldn't 
do anything? they couldn't hold us 
back. (146) .
The fact that the ceasefire agreement on Vietnam went ahead 
despite the refusal of the CPK to be involved was largely due 
to another misguided assumption widely held by Western policy 
makers: it was believed that without Vietnamese communist
support, the Kampuchean struggle would soon collapse in the 
face of superior American firepower.^ * 7 ) According to one 
CPK source,
f
the world's people believed that we would 
certainly be "flattened" as, from afar, 
they looked at tiny Kampuchea fighting 
without negotiations, compromise or retreat,
(148).
As will be seen, the United States Air Force did its best to 
"flatten" Kampuchea during 1973.
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With the deposition of Sihanouk in 1970, the interests of
the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist parties momentarily
converged. However, after years of being put on the "back
burner" by the VWP, the CPK leaders' animosity towards the
Vietnamese communists was fairly deeply entrenched. Although
the Khmer revolutionaries accepted logistic support from the
VWP, the Vietnamese communists' superior attitudes and their
repeated Insistence on attaching priority to the revolutionary
struggle in Vietnam - which had virtually been taken for
granted by the leaders of the KPRP during the 1950's - quickly
provoked expressions of resentment on the part of the CPK
leadership. Furthermore, by 1970 the Pol Pot group had built
up a small but nonetheless significant revolutionary force:
the CPK leaders had been leading the Kampuchean struggle on
their own for a number of years. Naturally enough, they were
unwilling to hand over the leadership and direction of their
revolution to the Vietnamese. In response to VWP attempts to
regain the influence they had once had within the Kampuchean
movement, the CPK resorted to what have been described as
(149)"extremely vicious measures". It has been asserted that
the "Pol Pot - Ieng Sary clique" sought to minimise the 
influence of the Vietnamese and those they perceived to be 
their agénts in order to "make the Kampuchean Communist Party 
dependent on Peking".^ 50  ^ However, the Kampuchean party 
leaders were clearly more interested in consolidating their 
own control of the party organisation. In any case, if the 
Chinese were playing a role in the widening of the rift 
between these two parties at this time, it was in the same 
indirect way described in the conclusion to the previous 
chapter: there is little evidence for direct Chinese
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involvement during this period. As Ith Sarin reported, as
*
far as the CPK was concerned, the Chinese were simply a 
"counterweight to the Vietnamese danger".
It will be seen that over the next few years, the CPK 
leaders began to purge all of those Khmers who they felt 
posed a threat to their own position within the revolutionary 
movement. Anti-Vietnamese attitudes came to constitute a 
means of consolidating this position at the expense of those 
who could be portrayed as pro-Vietnamese.
By the time the negotiations in Paris ended, it had 
become clear that VWP interests were once again at ocUfs with 
those of the Kampuchean party. The VWP was once again 
exhorting the Kampuchean revolutionaries to scale down their 
struggle in order to suit what were essentially Vietnamese 
interests. Thus, as 1972 drew to a close, any hopes of a 
lasting Khmer-Vietnamese communist alliance had been dashed.
It is quite fitting that Son Ngoc Minh - the man who 
personified the belief that Kampuchean and Vietnamese communists 
should work together towards a set of common goals - died at the 
end of 1972.(152)
CHAPTER 4
1973-1975
6t
On the 27th of January 1973 the Paris Peace Accords were 
signed by representatives of the United States and the D R V . ^  
The Vietnamese communists have maintained that their struggle 
was not compromised by the terms of this agreement: one VWP 
document claims that, despite "all kinds of pressure" exerted
by the U.S., the Vietnamese negotiators "made no concession
( 2 )on matters of principle". On the other hand, the CPK has
asserted that the North Vietnamese simply "snatched up the baits
(3)launched (sic) by the imperialists" and that, by negotiating
with the Americans, the Vietnamese communists betrayed the
(4)Kampuchean's revolutionary cause as well as their own.
By mid 1973 the only Vietnamese communist forces remaining
in Kampuchea were those stationed in sanctuaries adjacent
to the Vietnamese border: apart from a small group of liaison
cadres, there was no longer any VWP personnel involved in the
(5 )Kampuchean revolutionary struggle. The withdrawal of
Vietnamese communists from Kampuchea - which, as stated above,
had begun in 1972 - accelerated during the early months of
1973. 1 One observer comments that this was
an earnest sign of Hanoi's willingness 
to abide by the Paris agreement - at 
least in Cambodia - and perhaps also to 
decelerate the Khmer insurgents' military 
progress: from North Vietnam's perspective
the premature fall of Phnom Penh could 
1 have created an onerous responsibility in 
the governing of Cambodia or the 
establishment of effective control over 
the Khmer insurgent movement. (7) .
Friction between the "Khmer Krahom" on the one hand and the
Vietnamese communists and their Khmer allies on the other,
heightened by CPK disgust at the VWP's willingness to agree to
a ceasefire, may also have contributed to the Vietnamese
decision to speed up this process of withdrawal. Norodom
Sihanouk has claimed that the Vietnamese departed in 1973
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because the CPK 4emanded that they do so:
immediately after the signing of the... 
peace agreement the Khmer Rouge ordered 
the Viet Minh and Viet Cong stationed 
in Kampuchea out of the country ...
In this way the Khmer Rouge hoped to 
punish the Viets, whose government 
betrayed the common cause. (8) .
Etcheson accepts this view, commenting that the Vietnamese
were unlikely to forget this "grave insult". However, the
fact that North Vietnamese* troops and the Viet Cong actually
remained in their sanctuaries in Kampuchea's north eastern
provinces and along the South Vietnamese border after 1973
suggests that the VWP's reduced support was more probably
attributable to the Vietnamese communists'
overall Indochina plan ... Their 
primary interest clearly was the war 
in Vietnam; in Cambodia, their central 
concern was to maintain the level of 
security required for holding their 
bases and supply routes. (10) .
Of course, it is impossible to determine exactly what was going 
on in the minds of the VWP leaders. It should simply be noted 
that from the time of the Paris Peace Agreement onward, although 
the CPK still depended on North Vietnamese logistics to some 
extent, the Kampuchean communists were largely on their
own. Free to pursue their own initiatives, they now accelerated 
their efforts to bring their revolution to a successful 
conclusion.
Another factor added to the CPK leaders' sense of urgency. 
The signing of the Paris Accords left the Khmer insurgents to 
fight on alone, and consequently the full strength of the USAF 
was turned on Kampuchea: President Nixon was intent on forcing 
the CPK into accepting a ceasefire, in order to facilitate the 
withdrawal of American forces from Indochina. As one Khmer
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communist bitterly observed,
the Vietnamese signed their own 
agreement with the Americans and the 
B52's which (had) bombed Vietnam were 
all sent to pulverise Cambodia. (12).
The statistics concerning this bombing campaign, which lasted
from February to August 1973, are staggering. More than
250,000 tons of bombs were dropped from American B52's and
(13)Lon Nol's T-28's: it has been noted that this was nearly
twice the tonnage dropped on Japan throughout the entire Second 
(14 )World War. Vast areas of the Kampuchean countryside were
destroyed, and the number of innocent Khmer peasants who lost 
their lives is unknown.
Chandler comments that these bombings provided the CPK with
the
psychological ingredients of a 
violent, vengeful and unrelenting 
social revolution. (15).
The Party now saw the struggle in "apocalyptic terms" :
everything would henceforth be sacrificed to the revolution.
The destruction of so many villages and the deaths and
dislocation of so many people enabled the CPK to speed up its
(17)program for the communisation of Kampuchea. U.S.
intelligence officer Kenneth Quinn noted that
« in early 1973 ... the Khmer Krahom 
entered the new harsh phase of their 
campaign in which all rules were 
strictly enforced and unpopular 
programs carried out. (18) .
Quinn observed that this campaign involved the establishment of
agricultural co-operatives, the redistribution of material
(19)possessions and the abolition of debt. These measures were
often implemented with brutality. One Kampuchean who managed 
to escape from a CPK zone reported that the Khmer communists 
"killed people who did not follow their instructions or
ideology". The Khmer Rouge apparently preferred to
eliminate older people, making it clear that they hoped to
(21)build "a new society with young people".
The founding of co-operatives was essentially a tactical
response to the war. Thiounn Prasith has recalled that the new
system enabled the Kampuchean communists to co-ordinate work
hours to the American bombs:
It helped our people organise their hours of 
agricultural production. If there was 
bombing in the day, they all worked at night 
and vice versa. (22).
Becker has described the co-operatives as
fortresses that locked up the people, the 
harv á l and all material possessions for 
the/exclusive use of the party and the 
revolution. (23) .
Nobody was permitted to leave or enter these co-operatives
without permission, and in many cases entire villages were 
(24 )relocated. The Black Paper has claimed that the CPK’s
tight control of population movement helped to minimise the
casualties inflicted by the bombings:
The U.S. planes did not succeed in 
causing big damages (sic) to...
Kampuchea, for the latter was 
constantly on the move. (25) .
Bitterness over the bombings reinforced CPK animosity
towards the VWP. As Shawcross points out, the 1973 holocaust
confirmed the CPK leaders' conviction that
survival, let alone victory, could be 
guaranteed only by absolute independence 
from the Vietnamese. (26).
Etcheson observes that the Kampuchean communists' hostility
127)towards their Vietnamese brethren was "catalysed to near rage" 
by the 1973 bombing campaign. The leaders of the CPK believed 
that, if the Vietnamese communists had not signed the Paris 
Accords, Kampuchea would never have had to endure the holocaust
of 1973. Sihanouk expressed Khmer resentment at a banquetkVv
given invhonour in July 1973, when he stated:
While in the whole world and even in 
Indochina the peoples enjoy peace... 
the Khmer people are plunged more than 
ever in the hell of war. (29). (my emphasis)
The strict rules of the new co-operatives ensured that trade
with the Vietnamese communists came to an end. Thiounn Prasith
asserts that this was exactly what was intended:
The Vietnamese were the biggest problem 
in 1973. They would buy the rice. So 
we abolished money. If the people did 
not need money, if they lived in a 
co-operative where everything was 
provided for them by the state, they 
would not sell rice to the Vietnamese. (30).
Years later, Le Duc Tho himself acknowledged the damage wrought
by the Kampuchean communists' new policies :
After 1973 the Vietnamese forces were 
faced with obstacles created by the 
Cambodian communists to their moving 
about and purchasing foodstuffs. (31) .
In fact, the Kampuchean communists apparently felt that any form
of co-operation with the Vietnamese was now impossible, because
in the bosom of the party there would 
be no unanimity. All the more among 
the people who hated the Vietnamese (32).
However, the CPK evidently continued to accept Vietnamese
financial aid during this period.
In Í973 the CPK began to conduct direct attacks on
Vietnamese arms depots, hospitals and base camps situated in
(33)Kampuchea’s border regions. These activities led Quinn to
conclude at the time that the primary goal of the Khmer Krahom
(34)was to drive the Vietnamese communists out of Kampuchea.
The CPK politburo sought to explain away these attacks as 
incidents which stemmed from misunderstanding and unruly conduct 
by lower level soldiers. Although it is unlikely that they
( 2 8 )
were convinced, the VWP leaders, who were unwilling to pick a
quarrel with the Pol Pot group because sancturaries in Kampuchea
Í 36 )were still needed, apparently did not protest at the time.v
In 1981, however, the Vietnamese no longer had any reason to
keep quiet: one VWP document published in that year recalled
that in 1973 Pol Pot
provoked armed conflicts in Kampot 
province, murdering hundreds of 
Vietnamese cadres, combatants and 
wounded soldiers. (37).
Meanwhile, the Khmer communists accelerated the liquidation
of all ethnic Vietnamese and Hanoi-trained Khmers serving in the
Kampuchean revolutionary army and the administrative structure
of the Party. ’ They also embarked on a concerted campaign
to eliminate all reference to Sihanouk, thereby undermining his
popularity amongst the peasantry and eliminating the influence
of his supporters - particularly the Khmer Rumdoah - within the
(39 )revolutionary movement. According to the CPK leaders
themselves,
the Party took the position of strength, 
attacking finally and chasing absolutely 
the third force which was the obstacle. (40).
Local Khmer Krahom cadres ordered peasants to "support Khieu
(41)Samphan and no others": rather than emerge from the
shadows themselves, the core CPK leaders were deliberately «
promoting the idea that the popular Samphan was the leader of
the revolutionary movement. CPK propoganda teams went as far
as equating Sihanouk with Lon Nol and the North Vietnamese as
(42 )enemies of the revolution. In December 1973 the Khmer
Krahom in Kandal province reportedly "dropped the masquerade
of supporting Sihanouk" and publicly identified themselves as
(43 }members of the CPK, while in Prey Veng a Khmer Krahom unit
demanded that the local Khmer Rumdoah terminate their policy
of co-operating with the Viet Cong:
the Khmer Rumdoah refused, the discussion 
grew heated, and a firefight ensued. (44).
By September 1973 news of these conflicts within the Kampuchean
revolutionary movement had finally seeped through to the West.
On the 9th of September the New York Times reported that
the conflict is apparently the result of 
a serious split among the Cambodian 
communists, the United States analysts 
now believe. (45).
Earlier in the year, the CPK leaders had still been keen
to use Sihanouk's standing in the international arena to their
own advantage. In February the Prince made a highly publicised
"secret" trip to the "liberated zones" of Kampuchea via the
Ho Chi Minh trail. He visited Angkor Wat and attended
a mass meeting at Phnom Kulen, along with a number of CPK 
(47)leaders. However, the Pol Pot group was careful to ensure
that Sihanouk's visit had little impact on the peasantry and 
lower level revolutionaries: it has been reported that CPK 
forces encircled Phnom Kulen and turned away many cadres who 
were on their way to the meeting. By the end of 1973 Pol
Pot had apparently decided that Sihanouk was no longer any use 
at all : the November announcement that all RGUNK ministries were
(49)to be transfered from Beijing to Kampuchea was, in effect,
a symbolic declaration that the Prince no longer had a role to 
play.
As has already been seen, considerable political power had 
for some time rested with the Party committees in each of the 
Kampuchean revolutionary zones. This regional autonomy meant 
that local Khmer Rouge commanders had amassed a certain amount 
of personal authority which they were unwilling to surrender. 
During the period 1973-1975 the Pol Pot group made significant
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progress in consolidating their control of the CPK at the
expense of these regional figures: this process was not to be
completed to Pol Pot's satisfaction until 1978, with the fall
of So Phim. Anti-Vietnamese propoganda proved to be an
important tool in this undertaking : the Party centre sought to
discredit those figures whom they did not consider to be
sufficiently loyal by implying that they were
crooks, corrupt persons ... traitors to 
the revolution and ... puppets ready 
to obey the least Vietnamese orders. (51).
Although it is probably quite true that the CPK leaders were
anxious to purge from the Party all figures who they considered
to be members of a Vietnamese "fifth column" (or, at the very
least, potential members of such a column), it is quite clear
that the Pol Pot group often fabricated allegations of
complicity with the Vietnamese communists in order to justify
the elimination of any figures they considered to be a threat
to their own control of the movement.
In the Eastern Zone, according to the Black Paper, the
(52)party leaders were almost all "infiltrated agents" of
Vietnam. It is certainly true that, in 1973, even some ethnic
Vietnamese still held posts in the Eastern Zone branch of the
(53 )Party. The zone leadership also still included a number
«of Vietnamese-trained Issarak veterans: So Phim, the regional
(54)party chief, was one such figure. Furthermore, many cadres
(55)were married to Vietnamese women. Such people were naturally
loathe to treat the Vietnamese communists as enemies. Before 
the 1975 victory, the CPK centre did not feel confident enough 
to confront this group directly. Although "disappearances" 
arranged by Santebal began to occur in this area in mid 1975, 
the Eastern zone leadership was largely left to pursue its own
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independent policies. In fact, trade with the Vietnamese 
communists continued in this region until Pol Pot implemented 
his first purges of Eastern Zone cadres in 1977. ’ In that
year, the CPK centre began asserting that So Phim and his 
comrades had been assisting the Vietnamese communists in 
their efforts to "topple the Communist Party of Kampuchea and
* / co \sieze power" for many years. Hu Nim was forced to confess
that So Phim "did not agree with the (Central) committee
( 59 )about the policy towards Vietnam", and that:
Brother Phim also did not agree concerning 
foreign aid. According to this view, we 
must accept aid from every country. He 
stressed (that we should) gather forces to 
oppose the Communist Party of Kampuchea. (60).
Kiernan reports that clashes occurred between Eastern and
South Western zone forces in November 1973. This conflict was
apparently caused by demands made by the South Western zone
leadership that the Eastern Zone abandon its policy of
co-operation with the Vietnamese. By this stage Chou Chet -
the chairman in the south west - had lost control of his
region: Chou Chet had consistently favoured the policy of
solidarity with the VWP.v 1 By early 1974 the military
commander of this zone, Ta Mok - a staunch supporter of Pol Pot
had effectively assumed the leadership of this region. He
t
thereupon proceeded to purge all lower level cadres whose
Í 6 3 )loyalty he suspected.1 1 Meanwhile, Ke Pauk - another Pol
Pot supporter - was emerging as the new leader of the Northern
Z o n e . K o y  Thuon, the moderate, pro-Vietnamese figure whom
(6 5)he replaced, was executed in 1977. By the time the Lon
Nol regime surrendered in April 1975, the CPK central committee 
was, as a result of these manoeuvres, in a much more powerful 
position than it had been at the beginning of the civil war.
In September 1974 the CPK leaders made a formal declaration
of the "independence and sovereignty" of their party by issuing
the History of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.v ' There were
a number of differences between this document, which seems to
have been written by Ieng Sary, and the history which had been
produced by the Eastern Zone's Military Political Service
during the previous year.v 1 The 1974 document carefully
avoided mentioning any contacts or co-operation which had
taken place between the CPK and the VWP in the past. In fact,
the pre-1960 struggle was dismissed as "very weak",' * and a
new founding date was chosen for the party. It was now
asserted that the CPK had held its first congress in I960. 1
Thiounn Mumm recalled that
we took the 1960 date in order to 
disconnect ourselves from the ICP. (70).
Almost ten years of close co-operation between the Kampuchean
and Vietnamese communist parties was thus erased from official
memory.
The CPK made a number of other, more public declarations
of independence at about this time. Thiounn Prasith published
an article in one western journal, declaring that the Khmer
resistance was certainly not
* an incoherent rebel movement in fief 
to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
and to the National Liberation Front 
of South Vietnam. (71).
The fact that the CPK was in complete control of the Kampuchean 
revolutionary movement was clearly signalled in April 1974, 
when Khieu Samphan embarked on an eleven nation tour, thus
breaking Sihanouk's monopoly over diplomatic representation
( 1 2 )abroad. Samphan's delegation consisted entirely of CPK
(7 3)members. During his visit to Beijing, where he was greeted
by Mao himself, v Khieu Samphan declared that
in this war we have made great 
sacrifices. And for what have we made 
these sacrifices? It is not so that we 
can be dominated ... but so that we may 
be truly independent. We are not the 
slaves or the satellites of anybody. (75).
Kirk asserts that the fact that Khieu Samphan itinerary
included Hanoi indicated that the emergence of the CPK as the
real power within the Kampuchea movement had the full support
of the Vietnamese communists.v ' However, it is more likely
that the VWP had simply been forced to accept that the emergence
of the CPK was by then a "fait accompli".
By mid 1974 the Phonom Penh regime was in serious trouble.
In 1973, by cutting supply routes at the same time as large
(77)numbers of refugees streamed into government centres, the
CPK had triggered severe inflation in the areas under Lon Nol's 
control. Prices were estimated to have risen by 275 per cent
in 1973 and an additional 40 per cent in the first quarter of
( 78 )1974. However, it was the Fulbright - Aiken amendment,
passed by the U.S. congress in July 1973, which had sealed
Lon Nol's fate. This piece of legislation ruled that
no funds ... may be obligated or expended 
to finance directly or indirectly combat 
activities by U.S. military forces in or 
over or from off the shores of North 
« Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. (79).
Without American support, the economically exhausted Lon Nol
regime was doomed.
These developments caused the VWP politburo considerable 
alarm. According to Sheldon Simon, the Vietnamese communists 
were not enthusiastic about a military collapse in Kampuchea 
before a political or military settlement in Vietnam, because 
they believed this would
(74)
drain North Vietnamese administrative 
resources and enhance tendencies towards 
political independence on the part of the 
Khmer Rouge. (80).
Nevertheless, the Kampuchean insurgents managed to complete the
encirclement of Phnom Penh on the 10th of April 1975. Seven days
(81)later, the revolutionary army marched into the city: 1 the
Kampuchean civil war was over.
The CPK has claimed that without this victory, the
Vietnamese communists would never have defeated the Thieu
regime. According to the Black Paper, the Vietnamese -
observing the Kampucheans' victory - decided to mobilise
all their forces in North Vietnam to 
launch attacks in South Vietnam.
Without the victory in Kampuchea, it 
would (have been) difficult for them 
to liberate Saigon. (82).
Of course, the VWP sees it differently:
In March 1975 attacks by the Vietnam 
People's Army against the Nguyen Van 
Thieu forces ... led to the 
disintegration of the whole U.S. 
military set up in Indochina. The 
Khmer Rouge forces switched to the 
offensive and Phnom Penh was liberated 
on April 17, 1975. (83) .
One thing is clear, however: in April 1975, when the CPK and 
the VWP were swept to power, the relationship between these 
two parties assumed a different form. From this point onwards,
f
the conflict between the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam was to focus on the question of 
national boundaries, rather than revolutionary tactics.
It has been seen that, prior to 1973, the increasing 
friction between the Kampuchean and Vietnamese communist 
parties was largely caused by a divergence of party interests.
The developments which took place early in 1973 brought this 
process to its natural completion: whereas the Kampuchean
communists* interests haá been in conflict with those of their 
Vietnamese counterparts for some time, from mid 1973 onwards 
the Pol Pot group clearly felt that it was in their interests 
to pursue explicitly anti-Vietnamese policies. The CPK 
leaders' campaign to eliminate those "unreliable" Party 
leaders and cadres who could be accused of being pro-Vietnamese 
- as well as their willingness to re-write history in order 
to show that the halcyon days of friendship and mutual 
co-operation between the two parties had, in fact, never taken 
place - were both designed to strengthen the Pol Pot group's 
stranglehold over the Kampuchean party and people.
CONCLUSION
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In 1975, according to the Black Paper, the VWP leaders
had their faces cadaverous and livid, 
for ... Kampuchea won victory before 
Vietnam, (and) their plan to take 
possession of Kampuchea automatically 
fell in. (1)
Thiounn Mumm has claimed that, as soon as their own victory
was complete, the Vietnamese communists began "making
preparations to make it possible for Vietnam to eat up 
Í 2 )Kampuchea." Although such allegations are, at the very
least, distortions of the truth, it was not long until the
animosity between the leadership groups of the two parties
found its ultimate expression. By early 1977 Pierre Rousset
was able to record that
tensions between Vietnam and Kampuchea 
have led to a border conflict which 
has on several occasions resulted in 
military confrontations. (3)
This conflict escalated towards the end of 1977. Then, early 
in 1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale offensive against 
Kampuchea. ' ' Within three years of their "final" victory, 
the CPK leaders had been forced to return to the jungle.
Since then, they have committed themselves to the struggle to 
rid Kampuchea of the Vietnamese invaders and their Khmer 
allies ih Phnom Penh.
Although detailed conclusions have been made at the end 
of each of the preceding chapters, it would be appropriate to 
make a few brief comments at this stage. There are a number of 
theories as to why the Kampuchean communists distanced themselves 
from the VWP during the period 1963-1975. As has been seen, the 
close co-operation which developed between Beijing and the leaders 
of Democratic Kampuchea after 1975 has led the Vietnamese
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communists - as well as a number of Western scholars - to 
assert that the Chinese were seeking to drive a wedge between 
these two parties prior to 1975. Unfortunately, there is little 
concrete evidence to support this theory. Others have sought 
to explain the CPK-VWP rift by examining the CPK leaders* back-
(5 )grounds, the ideological influences to which these figures
were subjected during their formative political years' , and 
the traditional, ingrained hostility which many Khmers feel
( 7 \towards their Vietnamese neighbours. ' 7 Although such factors 
may have played a part, these arguments tend to suggest that 
the breakdown of relations was somehow inevitable.
This paper has shown that it is not necessary to resort 
to such speculative arguments. Relations between the CPK and 
VWP simply broke down because the interests of these two 
revolutionary organisations came into conflict. This only 
happened because, at various stages during the period discussed, 
external forces led the leaders of these two parties to modify 
their policies and tactics. In other words, even given the rise 
of the extremist Pol Pot group within the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, this split was not inevitable.
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